CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION STUDIES

Strengthening of National Research Capacity on Policy, Conflict Resolution, and Reconciliation (PEACE) project

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CONTENTS

1. FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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INTRODUCTION

The field of conflict resolution is t a relatively new filed that continues to grow rapidly. This chapter is catered for those who want to develop an understanding and knowledge in the field of conflict resolution. The chapter begins by examining the roots of conflict theory in the social sciences. This gives us an understanding of how to think of conflict as one form of human interaction through examining the reasons for conflict, purpose of conflict and ways of addressing and ultimately resolving conflict. Revisiting the developments that occur in social theory allows us to reexamine and update the tools and mechanisms that are used to addressing and attempting to resolve conflict in an even and just way.

In this chapter we examine the different methods that are used to reach such endeavors and the different stages that shaped Conflict Resolution as a discipline today. In the following section of the chapter we look at the development of the field of conflict resolution; how it was born, where it was born and the reasons for its birth. The field of conflict resolution is not only a discipline that thrives on ideas and theoretical paradigms; it also utilizes practices to minimize and attempt to resolve conflict.

I. CONFLICT IN SOCIAL THEORY

There are two roots of the conflict theory in the Social sciences and those are: Marxist theory of society and liberal and functionalist theory of society

I.1 Marxism - the Conflict Tradition

Thinking about conflict theory can be traced back to Hegel, Machiavelli or even further back. However, it was Marx and Engels who consolidated conflict theory in the sociological tradition. In the Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels assert that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle" (Tucker, 1978:473).

Marx and Engels' key sociological principles are based on class struggle. For them classes are divided between capitalists; those who own the means of production and the proletariat; those who own nothing but their own labor which they employ for those who own property. The relation of production is the base of every society and in modern capitalist societies capitalists own the means of production and the proletariat are exploited for the production of goods. For Marxism, arenas of conflict transcend beyond economic and class relations as the ideology of the capitalists informs the state's superstructure. Marx and Engels assert that the ideology of the capitalists control not only the economic means of production, but also the intellectual, political, legal and cultural ones.

The Marxist tradition perceives conflict as a catalyst for change; conflict within and between social groups is one form of social interaction which forces societies to reflect and oftentimes change their actions. They argue that Conflict prevents societies from sinking into an impoverished creativity. Conflict helps us to rethink social norms that may be based on unequal access to power, redistribution of resources, wealth and status and how they take part in structuring the relations between the different social groups. It forces us to renegotiate and resolve tension between what is and what ought to be, reconsider the clash of values and interest and come to ways of resolving those tensions.

For Marx, "Conflict leads not only to ever-changing relations within the existing social structure, but the total social system undergoes transformation through conflict" (Coser, 1957:200). For Marx, conflict instigates not only change in social relations between groups; it also discloses possibilities of change within the social structure as it undergoes transformation through conflict. For Marx, conflict is a symptom that discloses the latent elements which strain the society; it sheds a light on the underlying conditions that are at work in the process of challenging normative social structures while highlighting new and emerging patterns that emerge from such structures. So for

Marx, conflict is a healthy practice in a society as it keeps reevaluating itself in the aims of integrating more marginalized groups into the pool of citizenry with equal share to resources and rights. Thus, "what is diagnosed as disease from the point of view of the institutionalized pattern may, in fact, says Marx, be the first birth pang of a new one to come; not wont and use but the break of wont and use is focal" (Coser, 1957:201).[1]

One need not forget that embedded within social systems are power relations which is informed by competition over ideology, wealth and status among individuals and groups. There is never concordance between individuals and groups; conflict ensues when frustrated groups demand a more just redistribution of power and resources amongst social groups. Their demands will be faced with resistance from those who are privileged and have previously gained control over wealth and power. Consequently, contesting the legitimacy of one group's control over means of power may lead to conflict when institutional structures persist against the demands for integration and reform. "if... the social system not able to readjust itself … the 'aggressive' groups, imbued with a new system of values which threatens to split the general consensus of the society … may become powerful enough to overcome resistance of vested interests and bring about the breakdown of the system and the emergence of a new distribution of social values." (Coser, 1957:204). Ultimately, from a Marxist perspective a social system may arise that is based on a fair distribution, justice and inclusion of all groups found in the society.

Through emphasizing the distinction between class in itself and class for itself; Marx illuminates one important factor in group formation. Group formation and belongingness is established through a conflict situation and it is through this consolidation of group cohesion through an 'us' and 'them' dichotomy; does a group become a social group with clear demarcation of their group identity[2]. "It is this sense of common purpose arising in and through conflict that is peculiar to the behavior of individuals who meet the challenge of new conditions by group-forming and value-forming response" (Coser, 1957:205). This said, conflict through group action may result in a 'deviancy' which may be the preface of new patterns and reward systems forming in a society.

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[1] For further reading on conflict as a prompter for change see: Herbert Marcuse (1941). *Reason and Revolution*, NY: Oxford University Press; Lewis A. Coser (1964). *The Functions of Social Conflict: An Examination of the concept of Social Conflict and its use in empirical sociological research*, MA: Free Press.
[2] For further reading see Karl Marx (2014). *The poverty of philosophy*, CT: Martino Publishing.

The Marxist tradition refined and expanded Marx's theory of conflict to address not only class structures of control but also hegemonic structures in our modern societies which subordinate individuals through total social authority. Hegemonic discourse allows state authorities to create conformity under the pretext of national interest which aims at uniting all conflicting parties in the society and conform to the ideology of the ruling class. Thus for Marxism, conflict may be a catalyst in breaking the shackles of control and provides the oppressed with a possibility of breaking from state's hegemonic oppression.

I.2 Liberalism (functionalist perspective) – the Consensus Tradition

Contrary to the Marxist tradition; the Consensus tradition perceived conflict as a deviance in the society. The literature produced in this tradition focuses on the role of social practices and institutions. It examines the role that each individual holds for the survival of the whole group. The consensus tradition builds on the Durkheimian tradition which focuses on the collective consciousness of the social group and the mechanisms that are constructed to instill order, harmony and wholeness into a society.

The consensus tradition capitalizes on collaboration and cooperation between members of the society who share the same values and have mutual advantages. Those who adopt the consensus tradition believe that societies move towards equilibrium and social order. Society is perceived as a harmonious entity and key institutions are seen as essential in the consolidation of this harmony. Harmony in other words is synonymous to social order which is maintained and reified through state institutions where they learn knowledge, norms, values, and traditions that integrate them to the pool of citizenry.

Conflict is perceived as something pathological which needs to be amended and repaired to restore the society's 'equilibrium.' Addressing conflict in this tradition is problematic as it perceives the society as a homogenous group which affords equal treatment to all members of the society through the different mechanisms constructed by the state and its institutions. If the society does not function smoothly, functionalists label this as an aberration or dysfunctionality. This dysfunctionality is perceived as a negative consequence which jeopardizes the stability of the

social system. Criticism to this tradition is precisely this; the inability to see conflict and instability as a legitimate sign to the aberrations and inequalities that are maintained and reified in society's social structures.[3]

In summary; both traditions perceive conflict as a sign of disfunction in the society. Social theory studied the different reasons for conflict and ways to reprimand social aberrations. It was only the 1950s that we witness a consolidation of a new filed known as conflict resolution which aimed at utilizing social theory in the formation of a hands on discipline which had the tools to transform the theory into practical solutions to addressing conflict.

II. CONFLICT RESOLUTION

II.1 Definition

Conflict Resolution (CR) related to all spheres of conflict; whether it is on a micro level between members of a family, or between families, between social groups, organizations, communities or on a micro level between multi-national entities, global affiliations or between countries. The definition however assumes that conflict resolution comes after the existence of a conflict or a potentiality of an imminent conflict. Consequently, conflict resolution can be defined as "a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other" (Wallensteen, 2002:8).

When studying conflict situations workers in the field need to determine what are the components that trigger conflict. People may go into conflict when their needs are not safeguarded. In sociological terms needs are translated into the lexicon of rights which means that a need for shelter, warmth translates into basic rights, while access to land and property translates into economic rights. Evidently, the vocabulary of rights has expanded with the development of the field of social theory to include not only basic, economic and political rights but also social and

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[3] Functionalist theory has its origins in the works of Emile Durkheim, notable theorists include Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton.

cultural right. This asserts that the field of conflict resolution is constantly expanding and developing. This development was not only in relation to the practices in the field but also to the reinterpretation of ideas like freedom, rights, inclusion and justice in social theory and its redefinition to include all. The field of conflict resolution address structural causes of conflict that thrives on unequal distribution of resources. It is for this reason that an understanding of the deep rooted causes of conflict should be studied and understood when determining the right approach to addressing conflicts.

Throughout history, human beings have always waged conflicts for territorial power, for promoting a certain ideology, or for gaining power. However, many societies have also engaged in developing different strategies to address and resolve conflict. In traditional societies forms of resolving conflict were legitimated through traditional norms and relied on mediation, negotiation, adjudication and reconciliation to reach agreement on contentious issues. In traditional Arab culture for example the tradition the 'Mukhtar' who is the head of the tribe or village played a key role in resolving conflict between parties of his community. Other forms is the tradition of 'Jaha' where selected figures of the community take part in facilitating the resolution of a conflict between parties or individuals, 'Sulha' is another old tradition and translates to mediation and reconciliation in today's conflict Resolution lexicon.[4] Additionally, throughout history law was also used to reaching a non-violent settlement to conflict.

Building on old models and traditions; Contemporary conflict resolution developed as a field. It focuses on conflict resolution models that provide mutual gains to all opposing sides. It builds on academic research and social theory as well as traditional and creative practices. It also emphasizes the role of external intermediaries in ending conflicts.

In the following section we look at the five major periods[5] in the evolution of the field of conflict resolution. Throughout the five generations the field of conflict resolution developed its own methodologies and its own theoretical paradigms and sets of practices.

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[4] For more information on this topic see Mohammad Abu Nimer (2003). *Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam*, Gainsville: University of Florida.

[5] I utilize the same 5 generations of Conflict Resolution as elaborated in Ramsbotham's 2018, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* as I feel it is an appropriate way to see the field of Conflict Resolution and its development as a field that is harmonious and reflective of the relation of conflict resolution and critical/social theory.

II.2 Evolution of the field

1st Generation 1918-1945 – Precursor

The devastating effect of the first World War (WWI) and the frustration by many of the failure to prevent the outbreak of the war prompted many people to develop a 'science of peace' to curb the outbreak of a potentially violent conflict. The atrocities of mass killings resulted in the sprouting of pacifist movements and organization with a firmer conviction to finding ways of preventing future wars. Those were the roots of thinking about conflict and peace after 1918 which led to the establishment of international relation as an academic principle. This stemmed from the conviction that global wars as such affect the entirety of humanity and their future on the planet and the international community as a whole need to be wary of full-blown violent conflict between states.

The formation of the League of Nation in 1920 meant to reduce the causes of war and to foster collective security to stop wars. Other advocates to peace and security came from the field of natural sciences who were shocked of the utilization of science in the making of lethal weapons that destroys lives and communities. Those were critical of the contribution of science to the industry of war. Additionally, medical professionals were vocal about the devastating physical and mental costs of war. As a result, many advocates of peace promoted a multidisciplinary approach to studying conflict. Despite the efforts to curb violent resurgence between communities, the global economic depression of the 1930s, accompanied by the rise of fascist and totalitarian sentiments in Europe and elsewhere resulted in the escalation of conflict culminating to the outbreak of the Second World War (WWII) of 1948.

The scholarly research that was produced between the two World Wars were to an extent the precursors for contemporary conflict resolution. They include research and social innovations to thinking about conflicts, ways of conducting conflicts, and eventually finding ways to ending them. Nonetheless the variety of sources in the field have attested to the tensions and disagreements found in the field. Most of the academic research focused on studying violent conflicts such as war frequencies, revolutions, role of weapons and arms' races. Other research studied the roots of conflict as in the work of John Dollard (l939). While others have observed non-rational factors that instigate conflicts (Lasswell 1935, 1948). Some research discussed industrial organization and

how power asymmetries may create conflict which may be inverted through negotiations that would produce mutual benefits as the work of Mark Parker Follett (1942) attests to.

During this period, an important contribution to the development of the field of conflict resolution is the empirical studies of war and conflict that were conducted by Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin who went ahead to establish the sociology department at Harvard, and the Englishman Fry Richardson who has contributed to the field through his work "Arms and Insecurity and statistics of Deadly Quarrels" which was published posthumously by Quincey Wright work entitled "A Study of War." Those works provided the statistical data to base the analysis of conflict and war on.

It is worth noting here that the non-violence and pacifists' traditions have informed the conflict resolution as a field of inquiry. The work of non-violence by Gene Sharp (1973) and the beliefs of the Quakers, the Mennonites, and Gandhi were crucial in the field of non-violence. Ghandi's contribution for instance were important not only in relation to the non-violent approach that he took but also in his ability to emphasize the role of social structures in creating inequitable realities in social communities (Ramsbotham et al, 2018:44).

2nd Generation: 1945-1965 – Foundations

The devastation of WWII and the inability to stop the horrors of the war have prompted the development of the filed. Emphasis was given to the devastation of nuclear arms after the horrific destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many governmental and non-governmental endeavors were fostered which would prevent future wars through building new transnational institutions and the fostering of a reconciliation culture amongst former enemies. The establishment of the United Nations (1945), the International Monetary Fund (1944), The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (1945), and the World Bank (1944) were the outcome of such endeavors.

Other events that were shaping the new emerging filed in the aftermath of WWII were the threat of nuclear weapons, the upsurge in national movements for decolonization which meant that the lexicon of rights was taking a global shape as many actors in the global south were translating the

terminology of human rights and justice through the experiences that shaped their reality of oppression and subjugation. The Peace Research Laboratory was founded in 1945 by Theodore F. Lentz in Missouri, USA in response to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Lentz acknowledged that science alone is not enough to create harmony and peace between societies and with research and knowledge one would be able understand human attitudes and motivations which will help subvert sentiments of conflict.

Another important development during that time is the founding of the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1959 and the establishment of the Center for Research on conflict Resolution in 1959 by Kenneth Boulding and his team. Boulding's research focused for the most part on mechanisms to circumvent war; the reason behind this stemmed from the failure of the discipline of international relations to address the macro relation between states in the global arena. Boulding advocated for "reform of international organizations and the development of research and information sharing and dissemination.

Already in those year we witness the development of conflict resolution as a discipline with refined lines towards conducting research and the adoption of research methods that would be adequate for data collection and analysis. For Boulding, "conflict resolution meant the development of a knowledge base in which 'social data stations' would emerge forming a system analogous to a network of weather stations, which would gather a range of social, political and economic data to produce indicators 'to identify social temperature and pressure and predict cold or warm fronts" (Kerman, 1974: 82). This proves even further the need for understanding the social condition in a society in order to address the level of conflict potentiality depending on the institutional and structural conditions in a conflict situation.

Other spheres of conflict research were taking place in Europe through the work of John Galtung who broadened the lens of research through emphasizing peace research and not only conflict research. Galtung made Distinctions between three models of violence: direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. Additionally, he differentiated between positive peace which meant overcoming structural and cultural violence, versus Negative peace (the end of direct violence) which could be perceived as the agenda that is adopted by conflict resolution discipline. Galtung's

contributions to the field is invaluable, he founded the Journal of Peace Research in 1964 but above all, he was one of the thinkers who believed that peace research should not focus on war prevention but also to go beyond to studying the conditions for peaceful relations between those who have power over those who don't, between the rulers and the ruled, men and women, the western and non-western cultures… The tension between the pragmatist American of conflict resolution and the structuralist European school of peace research clarify the rift between the two disciplines. This said, conflict resolution studies today encompass the structuralist violence model as part of understanding situations of human conflict.

Another development in the field of conflict appeared through the work of John Burton. Burton was a great enthusiast of utilizing controlled communication, or the problem -solving method in international conflict. He eventually became the director of the new formed center for the Analysis of Conflict at University College London in 1966. He later worked on the concept of protracted social conflict which became an important part of the emerging theory of international conflict, "combining both domestic-social and international dimensions and focused at a hybrid level between interstate war and purely domestic unrest. Burton's novel approach to conflict resolution was his steering away from the conventional model of international relation and his reliance on multidisciplinary approach to understanding and analyzing conflict. Building on Critical Social Theory and the work of Georg Simmel (1922) who explained Conflict through the prism of sociology which sees conflict as one form of socialization which is informed and affected by the web of Group affiliations. Burton utilized systems theory to explain the cooperative and competitive behavior of social beings; he utilized Games theory as a means of analyzing the variety of options and orientations available to conflict parties. Burton also capitalized on organizational theory as a theory which promoted mutual gain and alternative ways to dispute resolution.

To conclude, the works of the second generation anticipated the new development in the field of Conflict Resolution in two main directions. Firstly, the notion to dig deep into the persistent structural inequalities for the purpose of defining the indicators to conflict so as to reach a more equitable solution to conflict, and secondly to adopt a wider approach to conflict through expanding the research lens from international relations to a more elaborate and multidisciplinary approach of social theory. In the following section we look at the third generation of conflict

resolution; it is worth noting however that the emphasis of both the first and second generation of conflict resolution focused for the most part on macro level conflicts that take place between states. This is understandable given the violent conflicts that were affecting humanity at the time were state centric as was manifested in the tragedies of the two world wars.

3rd Generation 1965-1985 – Consolidation

As this stage of its development, the field of conflict resolution is defined while drawing on a wide range of disciplines and in relation to specific subject areas in relation to three main subject areas and those are: 1) mechanisms created to avoid nuclear wars. 2) highlighting the need to remove blatant inequalities and injustices in the global system, and 3) ways to achieve ecological balance and control (Ramsbotham et al, 2018:53).

This generation of Conflict Resolution scholars elaborated a theoretical understanding of destructive conflict at 3 levels in the aims of refining the most appropriate practical tools for responding.

1) The interstate Level (Macro): The horrors of the two World Wars have alerted conflict resolutions scholars to the potential destruction that may occur when world powers are in conflict. Here the aim of scholars was to find ways of turning a contentious and conflictual situation into formal win-win agreements of which the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and Non-proliferation Treaty negotiations are examples.

2) The Domestic Level (Micro): plenty of work in the United States was done in building expertise in several fields such as family conciliation, labor and community mediation, public policy dispute resolution and alternative dispute resolution.

3) The mixed level: came into fruition as a result of the development in the field of conflict resolution during the 70s and 80s which saw a need to study deep rooted conflicts through the domestic and international lenses as the causes of conflicts were at times intertwined.

It is worth noting that the 70s and 80s brought about new terminology as a result of the civil rights in the USA movements of the 60s and identity politics. Added to that, the world was seeing new changes as a result of globalization which made not only the political elites connected globally but also individuals who could see their existence tied with the existence of many individuals around

the globe in a more tangible and concrete way. As a result, a new understanding of contemporary conflict was refined in the field of conflict resolution and terms like deep rooted conflicts (Burton 1987), intractable conflicts (Kriesberg et al. 1989), and protracted social conflicts (Azar 1990) were coined to explain those persisting contemporary conflicts and attempt to find ways to solve such conflicts. It is in this period that new systematic attempts were utilized to solve conflict such as problem-solving approach as well as negotiation and mediation processes.

Already at this stage we witness the development of the discipline in both its theoretical as well as its practical angles. From a practical angle, problem solving approaches such as interactive conflict resolution, third party consultation process-promoting workshops, facilitated dialogues were adopted as possible strategies to deal with conflict scenarios. Another mechanism to be adopted is the use of negotiation in international conflicts. The process of negotiation takes place when the parties involved in a conflict seek to find a way to settle or resolve the conflict between them. Sometimes the process includes a third party who is there to mediate between the demands of both sides in the aims of achieving an agreeable solution to both parties. Building on the practice of conflict resolution the concept of negotiation has been refined to include different models of negotiation-based approach such as interest based approached, third-party role ...[6]

Other tools that were elaborated on with this generation of conflict resolution professionals are diplomacy and mediation.[7] In this body of literature, there is emphasis on the different models of mediation, such as official, unofficial mediation and soft mediation. Emphasis is also put on reconciliation and diplomacy with an emphasis not only on high level diplomacy but also on the role of voluntary associations of the civil society in aiding in the resolution of conflict.[8] The role of civil society or a bottom's up approach is an invaluable analytical lens that was consolidated in the study of the field during this period with the pioneering work of Elise Boulding (1990) who put emphasis on a global civic culture for the sustenance of peace and justice across the globe.

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[6] For more information on negotiation approach see Druckman 1977, Zartman 1978, Pruitt 1981, Rainfall 1982, Hall 1993, Pruitt and Carnivalesque 1993, Zartman and Rubin 1996, Berecovitch and Gartner 2006, Mac Donald and Bendahmane 1987, Curle 1986.

[7] For more on negotiation see Mitchell and Webb 1988, Pruitt and Rubin 1986, Touval and Zartman 1985, Berecovitch and Rubin 1992, Kressell and Pruitt 1989, Berecovitch 1996, Bohmelt 2010, Toft 2010.

[8] For more reading on diplomacy see Diamond and Mac Donald 1996, Bergman and Johnson 1977, Mac Donald and Bendahmane 1987, Berridge 1995, all 1996, Anderson 1996b, Davies and Kaufman 2002, Curle 1994, 1995, 1999.

As the tools and terminology in the field of conflict resolution developed, scholars also capitalized in generating a two-way stream where the practice informs the theoretical paradigms and methodology in the field to better enhance the discipline as an academic field that builds on hypothesis generation, theory testing and theory use (Mitchell, 1993).

The Fourth Generation (1985-2005) – Reconstruction

This period was foreshadowed by the end of the Cold War; as a result, the field of Conflict Resolution took a central stage in defining the 'New World Order' and at the same time deal with the challenges that resulted from the previous era (Ramsbotham et al. 2018:59).

Despite the maturation of the field of Conflict Resolution during this period in terms of developing both quantitative and qualitative methodologies for conflict analysis and interpretation, new advanced issues arose that needed to be grappled with and those are conflict complexity, asymmetry, cultural diversity and intractability (Ramsbotham, 2018:60).

  i. Conflict complexity: Systematic complexity in a post-cold era was widely prominent as new wars were proliferating especially in a rapidly changing world that was becoming globalized. Adam Kahane (2007) identified three types of complexity and those are: dynamic complexity where the cause and effect are non-linear. Consequently, the development of the conflict is unpredictable and as a result the solution to the conflict requires a systemic approach. Social complexity refers to the contrasting and conflicting narratives and a resolution to such conflicts requires a participative approach. Thirdly the generative complexity refers to the inability of previous solutions in solving a conflict and as a result there is a need for a creative approach.[9]

  ii. Conflict Asymmetry: Advances in the field of Conflict Resolution took place in addressing the issue of asymmetry in a conflict. Asymmetry refers to either qualitative asymmetry such as between a state and a non- state or quantitative asymmetry such as between strong and weak states. In such context, critics to

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[9] For more information on this see Adam Kahane Solving Tough problems 2007, Coleman 2003, Coleman et al. 2005, Korppen et al. 2008, Lederach 2005, Ropers 2008a, Galtung and Jacobsen 2000.

traditional forms of conflict resolution such as mediation/negotiation, dialogue or problem solving approaches were perceived as counterproductive as it reifies the power structures and at times even reenforces the power of the hegemon[10].New innovation in relation to conflict asymmetry were inspired by Habermas's discourse on ethics and as a result a development of discursive conflict transformation which begins "with the premise that actions and institutional arrangements can be said to be legitimate only when they result from a process of unconstrained discourse in which all affected parties participate freely (Ramsbotham, 2018:63)." Again here we see how conflict resolution theory was affected by the discussion occurring in social theory where emphasis is out not only on equality but rather on redistributive justice where attention is put on the institutional and historical asymmetry in distribution.

iii. <u>Cultural diversity:</u> With globalization, the reach of identity politics became transnational as it expanded beyond the borders of the nation state. Huntington's (1996) controversial "Clash of Civilization" prompted efforts to think about conflict of ideologies, identities and culture in a more balanced way; that is without siding to a particular culture and ideology in the aims of integrating cultural diversity and multicultural ethos when studying conflict. Consequently, conflict resolution scholars had to deconstruct neoliberal assumptions when confronting issues like Islamic Jihad, religious wars and war on terror and analyze them through the prism of intercultural dialogue, social and global justice, and equal distribution.[11]

iv. <u>Conflict intractability:</u> Such conflicts are those that defy any efforts for a settlement and transformation of the conflict. In such conflicts scholars have found that there

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[10] For more info on the topic see Kuttab 1988, Rouhana and Korper 1996, Jones, 1999, Said 1995, Hoffman 1987, Rothman 1992, Andrew Linklater 1998, Habermas 1984, Vivienne Jabri 1996.

[11] For more on this see Sleap and Sener, *Theories of Dialogue* vol i & ii, 2013, 2015; J. Malpas et al. (2002). *Gadamer's Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, MA: MIT Press; Oliver Ramsbotham, Hans-Georg Gadamer (2015). Hermeneutic dialogue and conflict resolution, in F.P. Sleep and O. Senar (Eds.) *Dialogue Theories II*, London: Dialogue society; C. Rogers (1980). *A Way of Being*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin; B. Broome (1993). Managing differences in conflict Resolution: the role of relational empathy, in D. Sandole and H. van der Merwe (Eds) *Conflict theory and Practice: integration and Application*, Manchester University Press. J. Stewart and M. Thomas (2006) Dialogic listening: sculpting mutual meanings, in J. Stewart (Ed.) *Bridges Not Walls: A Book about Interpersonal Communication*, 9th ed. NY: McGraw-Hill.

is a need to determine the invisible dynamics of those conflict through strategies engagement of discourses as many have found that conventional conflict resolution methods such as negotiations, problem solving and dialogue won't solve such conflicts because there is a lack in agreed upon common grounds. Thus there is a need to create a common understanding and a shift in cultural trends between the conflicting parties[12].

Scholars of the fourth generation of Conflict resolution were constantly working on defining the methods and concepts of Conflict resolution. Aware of the new challenges that arose at the dawn of the 20th century they understood that efforts need to be done on both the state centric level as well as on the level of the civil society with approaches investing in the local, regional and international level since the globe was becoming increasingly interconnected and effects of any conflict has ripple effects that are felt throughout the different regions of the globe. The two main concerns that predominated in this period is to identify the conditions of the new world order based on conflict analyses, conflict prevention and problem solving. The other concern was to mobilize and inspire stakeholders through the promotion of a non-violent peacemaking culture.

5th generation (21st Century) – the Cosmopolitan

Conflict resolution today builds on a long a rich history of conflict resolution and the promotion of a culture of peace. The objective of the discipline today is to radically reform the World's political system, the promotion of anti-war and pro-peace politics and the fashioning of methodologies and processes which aspire to proactive peacemaking projects.

The maturation of the field of Conflict Resolution today attest to the ongoing dialogue between the field and critical social theory which have been constantly developing to include ideas of global social justice, fair distribution of resources, human rights to all etc.. Those theories have also acknowledged inequalities that preside in our social structures and systems and has as a result lobbied to find ways where such blatant inequalities be reprimanded.

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[12] For more on conflict intractability see Kriesberg et al 1989; Crocker et al 2005; Guy and Heidi Burgess 1996, 1997; Bernard Meyer 2009; Coleman 2011; Oliver Ramsbotham 2010, 2017; Christopher Mitchell, 2014.

CONCLUSION

Today's reasons for conflict are diverse and expand from conflicts on issues of statehood and governance to roles and statuses of nation and communities and conflicts between communities within states. New developments of patterns of conflict today have witnessed conflict between groups of a different kind. Those reasons vary from those conflicts that aim to political gains where power is consolidated based on ethnic homogeneity, a reinterpretation of identity politics through tribalist and communalist ideologies which bases its methods of mobilization through different means such as fear from the other, religious difference, corruption and distortion of facts through media utilization. Today's conflicts are diverse; they are fragmented and dispersed which creates new challenges to resolving conflict. Consequently, new, and creative ways are constantly utilized to address today's conflict and they range from Hybrid local-global responses to tackle the new reality of transnational conflict. As has been established the local affects the global stability and world order and as a result there is a need to understand conflict within those parameters and be able to transform the culture of conflict to a culture of peace through capitalizing on local and global initiatives.

One of the reasons of conflict is the inability to communicate and acknowledge each side's position; once one understands the underlying conditions of the conflict a push for intercultural and transcultural efforts may help addressing those issues. Addressing issues of conflict from this prism allow for resolutions that are based on a fairer interpretation of equality and a broader definition that incorporates ideas of social and global justice.

Experts in the field of conflict resolutions also acknowledge that there are new tools that can be utilized in their fight against a culture of war and violence; those tools incorporate the new opened cosmopolitan space of the internet and the new reality of globalization. If utilized right and if new alliances are formed between the different clusters of expertise and enterprises then there is a probability to diminish possibilities of conflict.

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2. THEORIES OF RECONCILIATION. BASIC COORDINATES FOR NAVIGATING DEBATES ON BUILDING BETTER RELATIONSHIPS IN SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION

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INTRODUCTION

Reconciliation, a term that seems clear to define in everyday life, turns out to be something of extreme complexity when described and implemented. In the everyday language of people, between officials, and academia, reconciliation consists of improving relationships between people and groups involved in a conflict. However, the complexity lies in the fact that there is no definition of what should be improved in relations damaged by violence, what the mechanisms of reconciliation should be, or how the relationships of reconciled individuals and groups are perceived in everyday life. This complexity, more than a blockage or a weakness, expresses the vitality of reconciliation as a project of social transformation and as a field of study.

In this chapter, we are interested in showing the diversity of perspectives on reconciliation, having in mind members of social organizations, academia, and politicians who are beginning to take an interest in reconciliation. We want to show that reconciliation is a multifaceted and disputed term. Of course, the text is also of interest to researchers and implementers of reconciliation strategies. To present reconciliation approaches, we critically use the four models of reconciliation proposed by Fanie du Toit (Du Toit, 2018) and Colleen Murphy (Murphy, 2010). In Fanie du Toit's typology of theories are mentioned: liberal reconciliation, moral reconciliation, agonistic reconciliation, and reconciliation as interdependence. While in Murphy's classification of theories, she mentions reconciliation as forgiveness, reconciliation as creating and stabilizing normative expectations and trust; reconciliation as a political value; and reconciliation as constituting a political community. Among the multiple bibliographies that exist to expose approaches to

reconciliation (Abu-Nimer, 2001; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004b; Chapman, 2009; Charbonneau & Parent, 2013; Maddison, 2015b; Philpott, 2012; Schaap, 2005), the classification of these two authors is helpful to contrast three themes within this field of studies: a) how the beginning of reconciliation is understood; b) how to implement actions for reconciliation and; c) what shortcomings and weaknesses each approach has.

Du Toit and Murphy's classification proposals are also interesting as an introduction because it allows us to show that there is a diversity of thematic axes within reconciliation that are not reduced to forgiveness. Of course, this is one of the fundamental themes of reconciliation studies. However, the association according to which reconciliation studies are the study of forgiveness does not offer a complete perspective of what is discussed in this field of research and action.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, we trace the basic coordinates of reconciliation studies within peace studies. Then we describe the four perspectives of reconciliation. We conclude with a reflection of the relevance of recognizing these schools and the dimension of reconciliation for the practices and research on reconciliation.

I. THE BASIC COORDINATES OF RECONCILIATION STUDIES

Reconciliation studies can be mainly placed within the enormous field of Peace Studies. While there are notions of reconciliation between various intellectuals and thinkers in the past, it was with the end of the Cold War that this issue gained space into the social sciences (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004b). The breakdown of that planetary order uncovered a pandora's box that led to processes as diverse as the fall of Apartheid in 1994 and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, the genocide in Rwanda and the conflict in the Balcans, peace in Ireland, which motivated interest in understanding how to create better relations between former enemies.

In this context, peace scholars realized that conflicts are not resolved with diplomatic agreements and strategic arrangements alone but when are conditions to live together without resorting to

violence are constructed (J. P. Lederach, 1997; Nadler et al., 2008). The notion of conflict resolution even began to be criticized by introducing the concept of Conflict Transformation to emphasize that the cessation of physical violence (negative peace) is not the end of conflictivity but a turning point for a society to process its conflicts through nonviolent means (Boege, 2006; Buckley-Zistel, 2008; Dayton et al., 2009; J. Lederach, 2015). Since the mid-90s, reconciliation studies were configured to understand the various dimensions relevant to creating a positive peace and understanding how former enemies build relationships without violence (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Kriesberg, 1998). In Martin Leiner's terms, reconciliation studies can be defined as the "description, interpretation and evaluation of the processes of creating "normal" and, if possible, "good" relations between States, groups, organizations and individuals that react against serious incidents past, present or that prevent future serious incidents such as wars, civil wars, genocides, atrocities, forced displacement, slavery, dictatorship, oppression, colonialism, Apartheid, and other injustices and human rights violations (Leiner, 2018).

In the same vein, research on reconciliation also aims to understand the social transitions. (Bourgine et al., 2014; Chapman, 2009; Dudouet, 2009; Maddison, 2015b). Because reconciliation is just one possible and sometimes the less frequent path that society takes after serious human rights violations, reconciliation studies seek to understand why the transition from war is not necessarily peace and why a political transition leads to the search for reconciliation and why others do not. Thus, reconciliation is studied not because it is present but because its construction is a fragile and complex possibility. As a field of research interested in social transitions, an essential issue is when the conditions for reconciliation begin to be created and what actions are necessary to promote it. Normally, it is understood that reconciliation is the outcome of positive peacebuilding, but other authors understand that this process begins amid conflict (Leiner & Flämig, 2012).

On that basis, several questions give life to studies on reconciliation that could be summarized, according to Bar-Siman-Tov, in the following terms:

1. What is the meaning and nature of reconciliation? What are its main characteristics? How can we differentiate reconciliation from stable peace? What are its major dimensions?

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2. Why is reconciliation so difficult for former enemies? What kinds of conflict require reconciliation? What is the role of reconciliation in domestic and international conflicts, respectively?

3. What are the differences between reconciliation as an outcome and as a process? What are the necessary, sufficient, and favorable conditions for reconciliation? What methods and techniques should be used in a reconciliation process?

4. What are the structural and psychological barriers to reconciliation? How can they be overcome?

5. What can theoretical and empirical knowledge about reconciliation contribute to peace studies?

6. In terms of policy implications, what lessons can be drawn from our theoretical discussions for current domestic and regional conflicts? (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004a, p. 6).

Addressing the questions that arise within reconciliation studies calls for the concurrence of multiple theoretical approaches, methodological tools, and disciplines (see Figure 1). Although the graph does not seek to be exhaustive, it shows that the relationships, scales, temporalities, ethical issues that make it possible to get out of violence and build positive peace derive in an intricate network of themes and involvements of reconciliation studies. Thus, understanding reconciliation at the level of different relationships (oneself, with others, with other groups, with the environment, with senses of transcendence) implies considering theoretical discussions, temporalities, and complex scales that make the questions mentioned above a transdisciplinary enterprise.

Figure 1 Reconciliation coordinates. Converging dimensions, scales, and theories in reconciliation studies.

Source: own elaboration based on Martin Leiner seminar on reconciliation at Jena Center for Reconciliations Studies.

II. FOUR APPROACHES TO RECONCILIATION

II.1 Moral reconciliation: reconciliation as forgiveness for social restoration

This type of reconciliation is called moral because it aims to create norms of coexistence (moral community) by putting forgiveness at the center of the reconciliation process. From this perspective, forgiveness promotes the restoration of social relations and the creation of a new sociability to escape the spiral of revenge and retaliation (Narvaez & Armato, 2010). Moral reconciliation theorists argue that forgiveness breaks the political economy of hate: the circuit of production, circulation, and consumption of hate that creates and reproduced groups and people's hostility (Narvaez, 2017).

It is important to note that the perspectives of social restoration have strong roots in theology. However, the emphasis on attitudinal changes has arisen the interest in neuroscience and

psychology to understand the creation and reproduction of prejudices, trust, compassion, and negative and positive emotions. [13]

Forgiveness is deemed the fundamental vehicle for building moral community because, according to this perspective, reconciliation is observed in attitudinal changes of individuals to overcome negative emotions such as anger, hatred, resentment, and indignation, which are natural responses to abuse (Murphy, 2010). Overcoming negative emotions through forgiveness is interpreted as the basis for building security, a sense of life, a new sociability, and a new narrative about the future (Narvaez & Armato, 2010). In addition, forgiveness is comprehended as the means to overcome trauma, promote reparation for victims, and restore the perpetrator's humanity (Philpott, 2012). In moral reconciliation, all these elements are associated with forgiveness's effect on the restoration of social relations.

As Murphy explains, the sociological reasoning behind reconciliation as forgiveness is that if an individual or a group retains resentment and hatred, social interactions can worsen or cease. Hence, restoring long-term social relationships depends on the willingness to overcome resentment and pain as well as on the willingness to trust that wrongdoing does not represent the core of the other individual. In other words, maintaining good relationships depends on the ability and willingness to forgive (Murphy, 2010: 10).

In terms of Miroslav Volf, the willingness to forgive is reflected in a moral call to individuals to embrace those they have seen as enemies and to restore the moral community based on the recognition of the other (Volf, 2000, 2010). From a Protestant theological perspective, this author has constructed a series of arguments about the relationship between forgiveness, justice, and reparation, taking the image of the embrace as the referent. He considers that the embrace is a metaphor for reconciliation and, more specifically, for the phases of an embrace can be taken as a model for promoting reconciliation as social restoration. He explains that the embrace between people has the following phases, which he describes as the Drama of the Embrace: a) open the

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[13] Three examples of this growing bond between forgiveness and neuroscience are 1) The Schools of Forgiveness and Reconciliation (ESPERE) https://fundacionparalareconciliacion.org/escuelas-de-perdon-y-reconciliacion-espere/ 2) Templeton World Charity Foundation https://www.templetonworldcharity.org/about-us and 3) Positive Psychology Center at the University of Pennsylvania https://ppc.sas.upenn.edu/

arms; (b) wait; (c) close the arms on the other, and d) open your arms to let go. That translates into creating space for the other to enter, in the will to give ourselves to others, to welcome them, to readjust our identities, of reciprocal exchanges based on trust and the recognition of the other as another different and not threatening, to create a new relationship based on trust (Volf, 2010: 108).

Daniel Philpott and Desmond Tutu interpret the embrace metaphor in a sequence of actions aimed at reconciliation (see table 1). For Philpott, it would be a) recognition, b) apologies, (c) forgiveness, d) repair (Philpott, 2012, 2014). Desmond Tutu, on the other hand, translates them as a) telling the story of the conflict; (b) naming the pain; (c) to grant forgiveness; and d) the renewal or release of the relationship (Tutu & Tutu, 2014). This interpretation assumes that the way in which individuals reconcile each other offers essential lessons on how groups can be reconciled and that the realm of the interpersonal and the social are characterized by continuity and not by a discontinuity (Du Toit, 2018).

Table 1 The translation of the metaphor of the embrace into practical actions for reconciliation

Miroslav Volf	Daniel Philpott.	Desmond Tutu
Open arms,	Recognition	Telling the story of the conflict
Wait	Apologies	Naming pain
Close arms on the other	Forgiveness	Grant forgiveness
Open arms to let go	Reparation	Renewal or release of the relationship

The perspective of reconciliation as forgiveness presumes that social restoration results in the establishment of correct relationships and that there are tools to heal relationships within people. As Fanie Du Toit explains, there is a social ontology at play within this kind of reconciliation theory that sees human society not as an arena of danger and violent competition, but rather as a delicate network of cooperation, through which sufficient levels of trust exist or can be generated (Du Toit, 2018).

A key element of the practice of moral reconciliation is restorative justice. Restorative justice promises healing and justice of the victim as the primary objective (Zehr, 2002). This usually materializes in establishing truth commissions, historical memory measures, public acts of forgiveness, or public acts of apology. These actions show that this type of justice is achieved not by implementing abstract judicial principles that do not take context into account but by restoring damaged relationships in ways that allow society to overcome historical injustices (Du Toit, 2018). In Howard Zehr's terms, restorative justice is the answer to the needs of victims ignored within criminal justice. He mentions four needs that victims have in the healing process:

1. Information. Victims need answers to the questions they have about the suffered wrongdoing. They need to know why it happened and what has happened since then.
2. Tell the truth. An essential element in healing or transcending the experience of crime is the opportunity to tell the story of what happened in meaningful settings, often where they may receive public recognition. This has therapeutic effects in the way people create a new identity and touch those who caused the harm because it confronts them with the impact of their actions.
3. Empowerment. Victims need to regain control over their property, bodies, emotions, and dreams broken by violence.
4. "Restitution and vindication. Due to material losses, restitution by perpetrators is essential to the victims' needs for justice. However, restitution should be complemented with the vindication of the victim's humanity through symbolic actions (Zehr, 2002, p. 26).

Similar senses about restorative justice are found in authors such as Marta Minow, who also mentions four victims' needs within the social restoration. She argues that restorative justice is set in motion by building the mechanisms for telling the truth about conflict, for the empathetic reception of testimonies (the presence of sympathetic witnesses), for putting individual suffering in a broader context to help people make sense of their experiences, and, finally, for identity recognition (Minow, 1998). In addition, she agrees with Zehr that when one of these elements is absent, the whole process is affected.

Fanie du Toit, Colleen Murphy, Ernesto Verdeja (Verdeja, 2004, 2009, 2017), Pablo de Greiff (De Greiff, 2006, 2011; De Greiff & Duthie, 2009), among others, have raised questions about the

perspectives of moral reconciliation and its emphasis on forgiveness as a fundamental result and vehicle of the reconciliation process. Here we can only summarize the criticisms in the following list of postulates:

- Forgiveness is not an appropriate goal for social restoration in societies in transition.
- Forgiveness makes reconciliation a result-oriented practice and forgets that reconciliation should be process-oriented.
- There is a danger that forgiveness and truth will replace justice.
- There is a danger of instrumentalizing forgiveness.
- Victims feel pressure when aggressors have offered forgiveness to victims.
- The prospects of social restoration do not have a plan B when forgiveness is not possible.
- Reconciliation cannot wait for the day when all differences have been resolved before it begins or even progresses. Waiting for the "moment of forgiveness" can block progress in the social restoration.
- It is unclear how the new moral community should be defined and how to prevent the reconciliation of one group from being imposed on the others. Whose morality should determine the form of the restored community and trace the steps that society will take to achieve coexistence? Who makes the call to the moral community, who decides on its implementation, and who should follow?
- Forgiveness cannot be translated into political practice. The institutions created in restorative justice neglect long-term political and institutional reforms and respect mediated by stable institutions.

Figure 2 Fundamental Elements of Moral Reconciliation

Source: own elaboration

II.2 Liberal reconciliation: establishment of the rule of law and liberal institutions

There is an idea among some authors who make criticisms of moral reconciliation that there is a "South African bias" in debates about reconciliation and justice mechanisms. They postulate that reconciliation processes should not depend on forgiveness or truth commissions but on establishing reliable political institutions that promote democracy, economic development, and the prosecution of atrocities committed in the context of a violent conflict (Corradetti et al., 2015; De Greiff, 2006). The so-called South African bias, according to the main critics of moral reconciliation, is that the search for restorative justice does not lead to retributive actions of punishment and represents a moral burden for the reconciliation process to the extent that it privileges an unrealistic social achievement (building a moral community) over the processes of building liberal political institutions (Gutmann & Thompson, 2009).

In this sense, a transition does not advance towards reconciliation if the society is not aimed at embracing liberal democracy and belonging to the liberal international community under the premise, widely disseminated by organizations such as the United Nations, that liberalism is the only valid criterion of any political progress. Despite recurrent calls for a more locally rooted approach to building "local capacities," peacebuilding today is primarily conceived as the process

of transforming war-torn societies under neoliberal premises, both in the political and economic spheres (Andrieu, 2010).

Specifically, under this perspective, reconciliation is seen as the process of generating civic trust and security based on the predictability of citizen and institutional behavior that is achieved with the rule of law and the economic institutions of capitalism (De Greiff, 2011; Murphy, 2010). Civic trust as one of the indicators of reconciliation is justified in moral terms, but here the argument is different from reconciliations as forgiveness approach. In her book *Moral Repair*, Margaret Urban Walker explains that political relations are damaged when shared normative expectations are transgressed and trust is undermined. Hence, the task of reconciliation processes is to develop and reinforce the normative expectations constituting moral relations and cultivate trust (Walker, 2006).

Unlike reconciliation as a forgiveness, this conception does not focus on the change demanded of victims but on the establishment of relevant and appropriate political commitments in transitional contexts (Murphy, 2010). Also, as Andrew Schaap explains, the liberal perspective of reconciliation is built under a pessimistic view of human nature as opposed to the perspective of reconciliation as forgiveness. He argues that for liberal theorists and, consequently, in measures aimed at reconciliation inspired by liberal ideas, it is assumed that people are driven to create a social pact not because people are intrinsically good but because political relations are full of insecurity, fear, resentment, and hostility (Schaap, 2005). In the same vein, reconciliation in liberal terms is based on the idea that it is necessary to repair social relations first to produce just and democratic political relations. In contrast, attitudinal change is secondary in relation to the institutional change that should be undertaken by leaders committed to liberal democracy (De Greiff, 2011; De Greiff & Duthie, 2009).

In terms of justice, liberal reconciliation theories favor transitional justice measures, which refers to the set of measures implemented to address the effects of mass human rights abuses and ensure non-repetition. These measures typically include criminal prosecutions, disclosure of the truth, reparations, and different types of institutional reform, particularly of the security forces and the judiciary (Corradetti et al., 2015). It should be noted that none of these measures is tied to

forgiveness either as a vehicle or as a result. Instead, these transitional justice measures aim to create increasing levels of civility, security, and trust.

For Pablo de Greiff, one of the most influential advocates of reconciliation in liberal terms, transitional justice is a holistic but imperfect process with two pillars: recognition and public trust (De Greiff, 2012). He explains that the first consists of making visible the effects suffered by the person to repair his agency not only as a victim but as a full citizen, as a bearer of rights. Recognition is then the principle to deactivate the ideas of superiority or privileges of some people over others on which criminal behaviors are based and install the notion of equality of all citizens before the law (De Greiff, 2012: 15). On the other hand, civic trust is not trusting in abstract institutions but trust between individuals who know and admit specific values as valid, which results in the recognition of the meaning of norms and sufficient active support for their norms (De Greiff, 2012: 18).

Under these principles, transitional justice seeks not to repair damaged relationships or social restoration but rather to rehabilitate both the perpetrator and the victim as citizens. Perpetrators can only be rehabilitated by judging and punishing their personal responsibility; victims are rehabilitated through material reparation and effective incorporation as rights-bearing citizens. In short, reconciliation as a dimension of liberal peace has the individual as its axis (Du Toit, 2018).

Although the liberal perspective has made visible the relevance of the political reforms aiming at non-repetition, several criticisms have been formulated to this perspective, mainly for its assumptions of how the social world operates and the closure of the political debate to restricted frameworks. Based on Fanie Du Toit and Andrew Shaap, the main criticisms could be summarized in the following propositions.

- Liberal theories of reconciliation have a narrow view of the conflict that results in a mechanical perspective of social change. They equate the lack of modernity and capitalism as the source of conflict and, consequently, the installation of these to solve conflicts.
- By criticizing theological positions, liberal perspectives equate secular norms and liberal institutions as non-dogmatic while regarding liberal institutions as the only valid path to reconciliation.

- It splits from the private/public as a guarantee of freedom and refrains from addressing issues such as attitudinal change, deeply rooted in systemic exploitation.

- Restricting political transition to political reforms and not promoting economic transformations and economic empowerment.

- It does not grasp the diversity of victims and does not understand questions of identity because people are understood as homogeneous citizens before the law. In addition, identity becomes a subject of private life.

- Liberal instruments are incomplete in addressing the challenges of societies in transition. Transitional justice measures may be unsuccessful in addressing other forms of destructive power that challenge societies in transition and may count among the root causes of conflict. Liberal reconciliation does not bring substantive conversations about morality, values, the value of things, etc., which can undermine the justifications of former enemies to live together.

- Liberal categories are usually regarded as fixed. The perspective circulating in international agencies, the media, and influential intellectuals is that the liberal paradigm should be the unbreakable normative framework for political transitions globally. This may result in the absence of policy innovations for reconciliation beyond turning citizens into consumers.

- Reconciliation in liberal terms is based on the result (trust, establishment of liberal relations) and the search for certainties closing the spectrum of issues and political perspectives.

II.3 Agonistic reconciliation: creating an open political space

Based on the criticisms exposed to the two previous perspectives, has appeared an approach is known as Agonistic Reconciliation. Here are two central authors: Andrew Schaap (Schaap, 2005, 2009) and Sarah Maddison (Maddison, 2015a, 2015b). They are strongly inspired by Hannah Arendt's conception of the art of togetherness, which translates into the idea that nonviolent political confrontation is the surest sign of progress towards reconciliation. These authors consider that moral and liberal approaches conceive that reconciliation begins and seeks to create a consensus in precise terms (forgiveness and adoption of liberal institutions) and that this consensus closes the political world of societies in transition by reducing the themes and instruments of the

reconciliation process prematurely. This occlusion of the political space is considered a risk because it implies the suppression of voices and demands that do not fit into the idea of reconciliation as forgiveness or the establishment of liberal institutions. To face the closure of the political space, agonistic reconciliation proposes that peaceful coexistence should be based on the cultivation of differences and disagreements. This means that reconciliation is not initiated by calls for restoring a moral community or liberal peace but by the willingness of enemies to "appear" to one another on behalf of a community that is yet to be born. We detail the approach a little below.

Andrew Schaap argues that in contrast to the two dominant approaches to explaining the conditions and possibilities of political freedom – that of normativized deliberation and that of communicative rationality – lies the agonistic approach. Agonism -from the root agōn, struggle- beyond emphasizing the inevitability of conflict, shows that politics is composed of divergence and lack of consensus and that the vitality of the political space derives from the cultivation of differences. Agonist thinkers accuse theories of deliberative democracy of depoliticizing social conflict by representing it in terms of an anticipated or counterfactual consensus. "Whereas deliberative democracy establishes the legitimacy of democratic procedures by appeal to the meta-political ideal of consensus, agonistic approaches typically insist that the democratic contest can and should go all the way down to include the principles and procedures that are supposed to regulate political life" (Schaap, 2009:1).

In this line of argument, it is understood why the agonist perspective of reconciliation considers that forgiveness or the installation of liberal institutions as a way of arbitrarily interrupting the political life of a society in transition. The authors mentioned above claim the value of political difference and understand that reconciliation is not overcoming differences but a call to create and expand political space under the principle of nonviolence. They understand that violence is always an attack on diversity. Moreover, the agonistic approach holds that assuming that conflict is reconcilable, in the sense of one day achieving harmony and consensus, obscures the policy of reconciliation and, on the contrary, sustains the hope that in the midst of spaces of unresolvable conflict, divided societies will expand their political capacities, embrace conflict without violence, and find new ways to respect old adversaries (Maddison, 2017: 158).

Agonist reconciliation is the opposite of assimilation, integration, absorption, or unification and interprets that overcoming the conflict by searching for some kind of political homogenization is futile. Schaap argues that, rather than seeking to re-establish unity based on a common identity, political reconciliation would presuppose a plurality of potentially immeasurable perspectives, not only among the communities to which the perpetrators and victims belong but between them. He further argues that reconciliation cannot be conceived in terms of an ahistorical ideal of harmony or consensus according to which discord and antagonism would be flattened out once and for all. "Rather, it must be understood as a striving for a sense of commonness that might be disclosed from the clash of perspectives we bring to bear on the world in our historical relation to each other. As such, reconciliation would not be about transcending the conflicts of the past by striving for social harmony. Rather, reconciliation would condition the possibility of politics by framing a potentially agonistic clash of worldviews within the context of a community that is not yet" (Schaap, 2005: 4)**.**

What defines this political community and ultimately reconciliation in agonistic terms, following Schaap, is the transformation of relations of enmity into one of civic friendship that translates into the care of a common world, the will to live together and take the risk of joining a fragile pre-moral community. The risk of politics, in this context, is that the world continues to be perceived from the radically opposite perspectives determined by a relationship of enmity. In that case, agonistic reconciliation promises that people, by engaging in an ongoing debate about the world between them, the world can reveal itself as an object that is kept in common but perceived from a multitude of perspectives, created intersubjectively between the former enemies (Schaap, 2005:69).

According to the defenders of agonistic reconciliation, this fragile, intersubjective, contingent construction of reality allows the prevention of mass violence. Thus, the opening of the political space, the creation of civic friendship, the recognition of the risks of politics are intended not so much to punish but to prevent the reappearance of violence. The argument is constructed, Schaap and Maddison explain, on Hannah Arendt's political theory in which she postulates that politics is nothing more than the refutation and sustained prevention of genocide. Arendt argued that genocide sought the disappearance of specific groups of people from public life and that, as a

contrast, good politics could be understood as one that allows people to "appear" (or reappear) in the public space(Maddison, 2015a; Schaap, 2005). Once again, we have the idea that the origin of violence is the attack and concealment of diversity.

How can be then put in practice the agonistic reconciliation ideas? Andrew Schaap summarizes the actions in the terms constitution, forgiveness, responsibility, and memory, topics to which he dedicates specific chapters in his book Political Reconciliation (Schaap, 2005: chapters 6,7,8 & 9). Very briefly, the characteristics of each of the actions can be expressed as follows:

Constitution*: consists of adopting constitutional policies. A process that encourages all parties to reflect on what it would take to constitute a shared and acceptable political life after the war. This occurs by constituting legal institutions that guarantee this space for political interaction based on the future, resulting in the construction of a "we," that translated into the political will of coexistence, the declaration of a "never again" and a new beginning.

Forgiveness: Willingness to stop judging others as enemies by recognizing the obligation to repair the damage and free the former enemy from the consequences of their past actions to allow them to act (politically) differently in the future. Forgiveness involves a willingness to explore ways of living with "the other." Forgiveness also brings to light the world that victims and perpetrators have in common.

Responsibility: Refers to how ordinary citizens can be held collectively responsible for tacitly supporting or benefiting from an unjust regime. This is equivalent to a declaration of irresponsibility and, from the perspective of future generations, this lack of accountability may seem like an ongoing injustice. In other words, taking political responsibility is not about purifying a tainted identity through demonstrating one's good intentions; it is about recognizing that one is implicated in past mistakes as a "consequence of one's entanglement in history."

Memory*: refers to actions aimed at remembering past wrongdoings to restore victims' sense of moral and civic value and construct redemptive narratives that reveal the broader context of violence. Actions promoting memory work open up new possibilities to discuss the past, discover

new forms of coexistence and frame the possibility of achieving freedom in the present. The declaration of a "never again" in a constitutional policy depends on disclosing victims' damages truth.

What the agonistic reconciliation proposes has led to a series of criticisms that Fanie Du Toit and Collen Murphy summarize as follows:

- It is unclear how to bring the parties into dialogue and get people involved in agonistic politics, especially when people's lives are dominated by fear or the struggle to survive.
- Indefinite process without steps and an emphasis on the process at the expense of the result. Agonistic reconciliation seems to promise a sustained debate on the terms of political association to forge new political relations.
- There is no plan B if the results hinder the creation of a civic friendship and the lack of trust between the parties. The call for former enemies to engage in agonist politics is difficult to justify with the argument "trust the process; it is for your benefit." In this context, an open invitation to continue a risky encounter is unlikely to be sufficient: a more convincing and less fragile set of reasons must be available to validate and justify political commitment to the enemy. In fragile post-violence situations, the overwhelming need is not for risk and fragility but security, certainty, and consolidation. When political, economic, and social frameworks have been destroyed, an invitation to embrace a deliberate (and indefensible) suspension of certainty seems unlikely to gain much support.
- There is no explicit promise for everyone, especially for the victims. Following the same criticism above, creating an open political space does not meet the needs of many victims who seek material reparations and rights restitutions. The emphasis on civic friendship seems to disregard the questions of attitudes, emotions, trauma, ostracism, terror, guilt, and shame that are the products of civil conflict and repressive rule, nor can explain the role that tradition and social norms play in structuring political interaction and making evil possible.
- Socio-economic justice is overlooked or relegated to the task of creating civic friendship and valuing political differences. This has as a corollary that agonistic reconciliation does not raise the question of how economic inequalities and deprivations are related to how people can participate in creating a political community.

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II.4 Reconciliation as interdependence

The notion of reconciliation as interdependence was introduced by Fanie Du Toit to respond to the shortcomings of the agonistic, liberal, and moral reconciliation theories and recuperate from them its most valuable contributions. This position includes European philosophical arguments but receives a clear influence from ubuntu's ethical tradition, a philosophy of dialogue that offers instruments to understand interdependence and whose best-known motto is "I am because we are." Here we describe the broad features of his argument, which he expounds in chapter 8 of his work entitled When Political Transitions Work (Du Toit, 2018:189–225).

The principle of interdependence, Du Toit argues, provides direction for crucial conjunctures of society in transition, such as the creation of nonviolent relations amid unfavorable conditions, the expansion of dialogue beyond political elites, and the generation of just socio-economic relations.

Du Toit expresses the centrality of interdependence as a fundamental designator of reconciliation by maintaining that "...the conditions for reconciliation are created amid adversity when both sides acknowledge that the realization of their own hopes and dreams are impossible without the cooperation of the other side... interdependence as reconciliation does not require fully restored trust, political forgiveness, or indeed any form of intimacy. It does, however, imply a break with the politics of violent hostility and the willingness to embrace seeking to work with and understand the enemy" (Du Toit, 2018:197).

One image that Du Toit finds significant of interdependence is that of a couple of enemies who are trapped in the same lifeboat after a shipping disaster many miles offshore: "To begin, trust and hope would be low and animosity high. Some will choose a dual to death with their fellow survivor or swimming for the shore, rather than having to cooperate with the very person they have learnt to hate so passionately. But should sanity prevail, there would eventually be a gradual, perhaps grudging acknowledgment that chances of survival are greatly improved first by remaining inside the boat; and furthermore if the boat is rowed by two rowers rather than one, working in rhythm toward the shore line." (Du Toit, 2018:17).

Interdependence is then not expressed as a desire and a will; it is a condition born of sharing a common space. Interdependence is then irrevocable, and there is no other option than to work together with the former enemy to achieve a future goal. This means, Du Toit explains, that reconciliation begins to take shape amid deep antagonistic relationships that are transformed as a shared future is embraced on the basis that this is not only desirable but (eventually) inevitable. Working towards equity and inclusion, reconciliation involves mutual recognition, progressive institutionalization, and the long-term socialization of an integral and fundamental interdependence (Du Toit, 2018:202).

It also suggests that reconciliation operates both "vertically" by trying to restore relations between citizens and the State (encapsulated in the "social contract") and "horizontally," improving social cohesion marked by fairness and inclusion. Moreover, it implies that reconciliation begins, not with a clear and well-articulated moral commitment shared across enemy lines, but rather with the acknowledgment by all sides of reality that envelops all of them, namely, that no segment or class of society can easily exist, and indeed cannot prosper, in the absence of the security and prosperity of others. A gradual movement toward shared norms and values comes from that acknowledgment to build a more just future. This shared acknowledgment implies a conception of justice that is fundamentally future-oriented, though not excluding dealing with a problematic past to the extent that it impedes the realization of a desired future (Du Toit, 2018:192).

In practice, reconciliation as interdependence is not seen as applying an orderly sequence of steps and measures. Rather, Du Toit explains, this is a process where there are no absolute certainties, and it is necessary to develop "a sense of momentum" but where there is an institutional and attitudinal platform for peace. He mentions that in practical terms, reconciliation policies should promote four strategies:

1. *Acquire a sense of interdependence* to deactivate discourses that promote the idea of hierarchies or natural privileges. Acknowledgment, respect, and the will to justice are the pillars of this practice.
2. *Establish the aspiration for a just and interdependent future* that consists of establishing justice measures to challenge structural economic asymmetries, transform power relations in favor of victims, address inequality and lack of political participation.

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3. *Dealing with the* past, which translates into establishing strategies to deal with the past by putting the victims at the center of the process. This means promoting the work of memory, establishing accountability measures, seeking the victim's sense of justice.

4. *Promote the rule of* law, considering regional cultural diversity and the impact of conflict. The difference with the liberal perspective of the rule of law is that in the case of interdependence as reconciliation, measures and strategies are defined locally regardless of the entire reconciliation package to the country. The idea is that the gradual and local introduction of the measure will produce a virtuous circle of engagement that will bring more actors and more subjects to the table.

The approach of reconciliation as interdependence offers answers to the flaws of other forms of reconciliation and seeks to create bridges between arguments stemming from the different reconciliation theories, which makes it a conciliatory, holistic, and practical approach. However, as in the other perspectives, it is pertinent to raise some criticisms. We propose four.

First, the concept of interdependence and the ethics that emerge from it are expandable. The reading of interdependence in Du Toit has as principal references the political science and ubuntu philosophy. However, a series of authors outside those fields can provide complementary notions to think about the concept, practice, and notion of reparation and justice that comes from interdependence. Complementary readings on interdependence can help to transform the notion of reconciliation into broader areas than improving relations between former enemies. We think specifically about the notions of interdependence that come from the various environmental epistemologies: post-developmentalism, Marxist political ecology, environmental history, theological ecology, ecological anthropology, ecofeminism, environmentalism of the poor, transhumanism, decolonial ecology, environmental justice, deep ecology, ecocentrism, the phenomenology of nature, among others. Notions such as sustainability, rhizome, the ethics of care, co-construction, enskillment, embodiment, autopoiesis, antifragility, ecology of knowledge, assembly, etc., are all relevant notions for expanding the notions of interdependence.

Second, the notion of interdependence is not carried to its most profound consequences. The notion of interdependence should be scaled up to broaden the boundaries established in reconciliation

studies limited to the reparation of relations between former enemies. Interdependence is a strategic narrative to bring enemies into a common space, but limiting it to this specific field of relationships would make it impossible to create support in the rest of society. The task of expanding the notion of interdependence, then, is not merely a question of recognizing the interdependence of the former enemies. It is a question of acknowledging the interdependence of all at different levels, not only economic and political but ecological and identitarian ones.

Third. The visibility and expansion of interdependence is understood as a process that trickles down from the elites to the rest of society. The idea transmitted in Du Toit's argument is that, based on a culturally-rooted ethic such as ubuntu, the elites have managed to understand the meaning of interdependence and are in charge of spreading this notion in society. However, is this process not the other way around? Is not interdependence being practiced between grassroots social organizations between neighbors? What other notions and practices of interdependence are circulating in society? How have the elites or public figures who promote reconciliation learned these practices and notions of interdependence?

Four. The distinction between interdependence and co-dependence and how this would translate into strategies to break economic inequalities and exclusions is unclear. Understanding that Du Toit does not seek to offer an economic recipe, he rightly insists on the need for reconciliation to promote a more inclusive economy. However, he leaves us with many questions about how he conceives "the political economy of reconciliation."

CONCLUSIONS

The revision of reconciliation theories show us not only the contrasts between the different perspectives but also allow us to distinguish some of the most prominent dimensions of reconciliation, such as:
- The change of attitudes between people involved in a conflict.
- Restoration of the victims's dignity and rights through material-economic reparation, prosecution of the perpetrators, knowledge of the truth and memory work.

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- Opening of the political space and creation of a political community.

- Promotion of the sense of interdependence to transform social representations that promote exploitation, segregation, enmity.

- Transformations in the economic structure to break the cycles of exclusion.

Some of these dimensions enjoy more attention than others, as we saw. For example, changing attitudes, restoring victims, and creating a political community are more present than the themes of economic transformations necessary for reconciliation (the political economy of reconciliation) and the promotion of a sense of interdependence. What is relevant in an introductory discussion is to ask why it is relevant to consider these dimensions and the theories of reconciliation.

On the understanding that the study on reconciliation is a transdisciplinary field but that, at the same time, researchers interested in this subject come with a disciplinary identity, we consider that it is essential to take into account the dimensions and theories raised here to reflect on how a particular interest (law, economics, neurology, linguistics, social geography, history, digital humanities, theology, sociology, environmental epistemologies, etc.) intersects with reconciliation as a research topic and how social practice.

Recognizing theories and dimensions is also a starting point to propose practical and theoretical research that allows expanding reconciliation studies. What we reviewed here, for example, shows that studies on reconciliation have been mostly concerned with the question of how to improve relations between former enemies and between victims and perpetrators. However, after mass violence, many relationships should be repaired. This situation invites us to think about reconciliation beyond these two nuclei of relationships. Alternatively, at least, it invites us to reflect on how the improvement of relations between former enemies and between victims and perpetrators is related to the improvement of other types of broken relations in the context of violence. Among the relationships that are damaged and need to be repaired during a period of massive human rights aggression are relationships between people who cannot be identified as victims, perpetrators, or enemies. There are also the relationships between citizens and officials (people and State institutions), the relationships between ethnic groups, and people's relationships with the environment. Martin Leiner raises this when he mentions that reconciliation implies

thinking about the dimension of oneself, others, other groups, environment, and with the senses of transcendence.

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3. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE LINEAR REGRESSION

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INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we explore the technique of the linear regression as a method of statistical analysis. In a nutshell, the linear regression consists of analyzing the relationship of several variables (independent variables) with another one (dependent variable). This method is common in statistical studies, and it is at the same time not too simple and not too difficult to implement.

The strategy we follow in this chapter to present the linear regression is to present the theory while analyzing an example on peace studies. We are going to use an indicator for Mahatma Gandhi's concept of *Sarvodaya* (welfare for all) to propose an ethical understanding of happiness that leads to the satisfaction of the needs of all humans (present and future generations). With this concept, Mahatma Gandhi proposed establishing institutions in society that guarantee everyone's wellbeing, as well as fostering values such as equality, justice and solidarity through direct participation. We will provide also visual specifications on how to do it in SPSS.

I. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL

The linear regression model can be expressed as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_n X_{kn} + \varepsilon_i \qquad i = 1,2,3, \ldots n$$

In this expression, each of the parameters or coefficients are denoted by β, and measure the magnitude of the effect of each of the explanatory, or exogenous or independent variables (X, there are k variables in this model), on the explained, or endogenous or dependent variable (Y). The coefficient β_0 is the constant term or intercept, which does not depend on any variable. The subscripts (i) of the independent variables refer to the observations or cases of each of the variables. The error term of the model is represented by ε.

The main objective of the estimation of the linear regression model is to find the estimated value of the β, in order to know the influence of each of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

This model is formulated under a series of hypotheses regarding its specification, as well as a series of assumptions, which we summarize as follows: linearity of the model, normality of the errors, constant variance of the errors (homoscedasticity), independence of the errors and non-collinearity. Below we expand on the meaning of some of these assumptions and contrast what happens if they are not fulfilled.

I.1 The linear regression model in matrix form

The linear regression model can be written in matrix form in the following way:

$$\begin{pmatrix} Y_1 \\ Y_2 \\ \vdots \\ Y_n \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & X_{11} & \cdots & X_{k1} \\ 1 & X_{12} & \cdots & X_{k2} \\ \cdots & \cdots & \ddots & \cdots \\ 1 & X_{1n} & \cdots & X_{kn} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \beta_0 \\ \beta_1 \\ \vdots \\ \beta_n \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_1 \\ \varepsilon_2 \\ \vdots \\ \varepsilon_n \end{pmatrix}$$

and in abbreviated form would be:

$$Y = X\beta + \varepsilon$$

I.2 The variables of the model

The dependent variable of the model must be quantitative, such as the number of people attending a demonstration, the Gross Domestic Product of a nation, the height of a person, the amount of milk produced by each cow, or the sales of a company. If the dependent variable of the model were of a qualitative type, then we would have to resort to other more advanced analysis techniques, such as probabilistic models.

The independent variables of the model, however, can be either qualitative or quantitative. The treatment and interpretation of one or the other in the model will depend on their nature. However, if they are qualitative, they must be transformed in a special way. This transformation will be discussed later.

II. EXAMPLE: SARVODAYA

We would like to introduce an example at the beginning of this topic. Since the linear regression model consists of somewhat advanced statistical issues, following an example to clarify the issues presented can be very useful.

We would like to assess the influence of some observed variables on the opinion of Sarvodaya. We approach the Sarvodaya idea by asking students their personal valuation on this sentence: "The institutions, through democratic participation and by peaceful means, must aim at the welfare of all people, particularly the most disadvantaged". They were asked to rate this sentence using a 5-point Likert scale, going from "strongly disagree (1)" to "strongly agree (5)", being 3 a middle point. We relate the Sarvodaya variable with different variables

Note that the variable Sarvodaya is qualitative and ordinal, but we are going to treat it as quantitative, as in most cases the linear regression for estimating these kind of variables give similar results that using other advanced methods more appropriate for qualitative ordinal variables.

Age. We consider the age in years specified by respondents.

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Gender. This variable takes a value of 1 if the individual is a woman and 0 otherwise.

Marital status. This variable equals 1 if the respondent is single, without a stable partner.

Relationships. The variable *relationships* informs about the social life of the respondents. They were asked about the frequency with which they are in touch with their relatives, friends and neighbours on a scale of 1 (never) to 5 (every day or almost every day). We calculate the variable as the average of the scores obtained in the three items (family, friends and neighbours).

Involvement with nature. In order to assess the participants' connection to nature, we use the connectedness to nature scale (Mayer & Frantz, 2004). This is a scale comprising 14 items such as "I often feel a sense of oneness with the natural world around me." or "I often feel part of the web of life." People replied to these items with a Likert 5-point scale, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The connectedness to nature scale was calculated averaging the score of all items, with reverse scoring where appropriate.

Political orientation. We asked them "Are you more of a left-wing person, a right-wing person, or neither?". The answer was a 10-point Likert scale (from extreme left to extreme right).

We want to estimate the variable Sarvodaya as a function of the rest of the variables using the linear model, so Sarvodaya is the dependent variable and the rest are independent variables. Considering the model described in the previous sections, what is the value of n? What is the value of k? k is the number of independent variables, which amounts to 6. n is the number of observations, which amounts to 1094.

In matrix form, the matrices would be expressed as follows:

$$Y = \begin{pmatrix} Y_1 \\ Y_2 \\ \vdots \\ Y_n \end{pmatrix} ; \ X = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & X_{11} & \cdots & X_{k1} \\ 1 & X_{12} & \cdots & X_{k2} \\ \cdots & \cdots & \ddots & \cdots \\ 1 & X_{1n} & \cdots & X_{kn} \end{pmatrix}$$

matrix Y would be represented by the column corresponding to the end variable, and matrix X would be a matrix composed of a column of ones and the rest of the columns by the rest of the

independent variables (from *age* to *political orientation*). Figure 1 shows the view of the data according to SPSS.

The model to be estimated would therefore be as follows:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \varepsilon_i$$

Figure 1

sarvodaya.sav [DataSet1] - IBM SPSS Statistics Data Editor

File   Edit   View   Data   Transform   Analyze   Direct Marketing   Graphs   Utilities   Add-ons   Window   Help

	sarvodaya	age	gender	marital_status	relationships	nature_connection	political_orientation
1	4	18	1	1	4,67	2,93	5
2	5	20	1	1	4,33	3,64	7
3	5	20	1	0	3,33	4,36	3
4	5	22	1	1	3,33	3,21	3
5	5	18	0	1	4,00	2,71	10
6	5	21	0	1	4,33	3,64	5
7	3	18	0	1	2,00	3,50	6
8	4	21	1	1	3,33	4,00	5
9	4	22	1	0	4,00	2,93	5
10	5	19	0	1	3,33	2,14	5
11	4	20	0	1	4,33	2,79	3
12	5	26	0	1	4,67	4,86	4
13	4	20	1	0	3,33	2,57	6
14	4	22	1	1	2,67	2,57	5
15	5	18	1	1	4,67	3,00	6
16	3	26	1	1	4,00	2,79	6
17	4	18	1	1	3,67	3,36	5
18	4	19	1	0	4,00	3,43	6
19	4	19	1	1	2,33	3,21	3
20	5	22	0	0	3,33	2,07	3
21	5	19	1	0	3,33	4,14	5
22	4	20	1	1	3,33	3,07	4
23	5	19	0	1	4,00	1,93	5

III. MODEL ERRORS

The model error term encompasses what the model cannot explain through the independent variables. What we are trying to do is to predict a variable (the dependent variable) using other different variables. This task will, in most cases, only approximate this variable (we will see in the goodness-of-fit section to what extent approximation is possible). The part that the model cannot approximate in each observation is constituted by the error term ε.

In more technical terms, the model errors refer to the difference between the actual values of the independent variables and the values predicted by the regression model.

IV. SIMPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The linear regression model that meets the above assumptions (linearity of the model, normality of the errors, constant variance of the errors -homoscedasticity-, independence of the errors and non-collinearity) is known as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and is a method that allows the coefficients β to be calculated using the following formula:

$$\hat{\beta} = (X'X)^{-1}X'Y$$

We will not go into this formula in depth, since this is a basic course. Just comment that $\hat{\beta}$ refers to the coefficients estimated by OLS, X' refers to the matrix X transposed and -1 refers to the inverse of a matrix. This matrix knowledge is not necessary to follow the course, but the authors did not want to overlook the opportunity to briefly explain the above formula.

The ordinary least squares method is the method we will use throughout this course. The above formula is the product of a complex mathematical analysis that we omit here. We should only recall that this method aims to minimize the squared errors (as its name indicates) of the linear model expression:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \cdots + \beta_n X_{kn} + \varepsilon_i$$

IV.1 Estimating the linear regression model with SPSS

In this section we will explain how to estimate the linear regression model with the SPSS program. The structure of this section is intended to be as clear as possible, so that students can follow the steps to perform their own estimations. At the same time we do not want to leave anything important out. Therefore, the estimation procedure is analyzed through an example as a central axis, around which we will explain the most important statistics at the level of this course, as well as their interpretation and that of the estimated coefficients.

First, we deal with the estimation of the univariate model and then with the estimation of the multivariate model. The rest of the section is devoted to explaining the tables of results derived from this estimation.

Estimating the univariate linear regression model

We are going to estimate the following model, assuming that we have only one independent variable, that is why this model is called univariate linear model. We assume that the Sarvodaya is determined by connectedness to nature.

Therefore, following our example:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 nature\_connection + \varepsilon_i$$

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To perform the model estimation, we must select "Analyze" → "Regression" → "Linear", as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

We enter the variables in the window that opens, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3

If we click "OK", we will obtain the results. In the following sections we focus on the results of the multivariate model.

Estimating the multivariate linear regression model

We want to estimate the following model using SPSS:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \varepsilon_i$$

As in the previous step, to perform the model estimation we should select "Analyze" → "Regression" → "Linear", as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4

We enter the variables in the window that opens, as shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5

If we click on the "Accept" button, we obtain different tables that are displayed in the results screen. The rest of this section will be devoted to explaining the meaning of these estimates.

IV.2 Goodness of fit

The term goodness-of-fit in the linear regression model is intended to answer the following question: how well do the independent variables explain the dependent variable? A high goodness-of-fit indicates that we have chosen the right model to estimate the data, and that the independent variables included as a whole contribute to explain the dependent variable quite well. In the case of the univariate model, we would be talking about only one variable. As for the fact that the independent variables as a whole explain the dependent variable well, this does not mean that there are no other variables that contribute to creating a better goodness of fit. In the same way, perhaps the model can include superfluous variables that could be dispensable without the need to reduce the goodness of fit.

R-squared, adjusted R-squared and typical error

A frequently used goodness-of-fit indicator is the R-squared (R^2). The higher the R-squared, the better the goodness-of-fit of the model, and the lower the value, the lower the goodness-of-fit. The minimum value it can take is 0 (0%) and the maximum is 1 (100%). In other words, the higher its value, the more valid the model will be. In more technical terms, the R-squared expresses the proportion of the variance of the dependent variable that can be explained by the independent variables.

Another goodness-of-fit indicator, downward corrected for the number of observations and independent variables, is the adjusted R-squared, which is expressed as follows:

$$R_{adj}^2 = R^2 - [k(1 - R^2)/(n - k - 1)]$$

k is the number of independent variables, which amounts to 6 in our example, and n is the number of observations, which amounts to 1094. This indicator is sometimes quite preferable to the previous one, since the normal R-squared may be too optimistic when we use few cases and many independent variables. To correct for the effect of a higher than normal R-squared when this type of analysis occurs, we use the adjusted R-squared.

The standard error of the estimation is the standard deviation of the residuals, that is, the standard deviation of the difference between the observed dependent variable and the one predicted by the model. The larger the R-squared, the smaller the standard error. Therefore, the smaller the standard error, the better the goodness of fit of the model.

Following our example of Sarvodaya, if we return to the result of selecting "Accept", we will obtain a series of boxes, among which we highlight the one in Figure 6.

Figure 6

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,218[a]	,048	,047	,891

a. Predictors: (Constant), nature_connection

The table summarizes the goodness of fit of the model $sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 nature\_connection + \varepsilon_i$. Its R-squared is somewhat small, 0.048, which is not too different from its adjusted R-squared since we have quite a few observations and only one independent variable. The standard error of the estimation is high.

Let us see next what results we have in the multivariate model. Estimating the lineal model: $sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships + \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \varepsilon_i$, which is equivalent to selecting "Accept" as explained in the previous lines, we obtain, among others, Figure 7.

Figure 7

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,302[a]	,091	,086	,873

a. Predictors: (Constant), political_orientation, marital_status, relationships, age, gender, nature_connection

The standard error of the estimation has decreased slightly. We see that the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared have increased with the introduction of the variables. However, they are still small. This does not mean that the model is inadequate, but it indicates that more key variables would be needed to better predict the Sarvodaya variable.

But... How do we really know that our model is adequate, and the R-squared result is not based on randomly introduced variables, which for some reason have increased its value. In the next section we present a way to find out.

The statistic F

The F statistic tests the overall significance of the model, i.e., whether the model is valid for prediction. In somewhat more technical words, the F statistic tests the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are equal to zero. In Figure 8 and 9 we include the table showing the F-statistic for our univariate and multivariate example, respectively:

Figure 8

ANOVAᵃ

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	43,296	1	43,296	54,488	,000ᵇ
	Residual	867,706	1092	,795		
	Total	911,002	1093			

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

b. Predictors: (Constant), nature_connection

Figure 9

ANOVAᵃ

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	83,320	6	13,887	18,237	,000ᵇ
	Residual	827,682	1087	,761		
	Total	911,002	1093			

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

b. Predictors: (Constant), political_orientation, marital_status, relationships, age, gender, nature_connection

The last column indicates the p-value of the F-statistic. In both cases the probability that all coefficients are equal to zero is very small (probability<0.000), so in both models we find that we cannot accept the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, and therefore, both models are valid.

IV.3 A brief but important note in testing statistics: the p-value

There is a concept that is essential in statistics, and that is the p-value or critical level, which is defined as the smallest probability by which a null hypothesis (H_0) can be accepted. The smaller this probability, the greater the chance of rejecting the null hypothesis.

We can compare our p-value to draw conclusions about our null hypothesis. The comparison will be made with the α, which normally assumes a value of 0.05. Thus, if the p-value is smaller than

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α, we will reject the null hypothesis. In other words, when the probability of accepting H_0 of the calculated statistic is smaller than the probability of rejection that the researcher chooses, we can then say that we reject H_0 with a confidence level equal to 1- α. Schematically:

- If p-value≤ α ->We reject H_0
- If p-value>α ->Accept H_0

In the case of the F test in the previous subsection, the null hypothesis is that the model cannot be used for interpretation. Given that p-value is lower than 0.05, then we reject the null hypothesis that the model is not valid for interpretation and we can use the model for analysis.

IV.4 The model coefficients.

Once the goodness-of-fit of the models has been analyzed, we move on to the interpretation of the coefficients. To explain the interpretation, we will continue as we have done so far: we will advance through an example that allows us to clarify the concepts as we explain them.

Let us take our multivariate model:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \varepsilon_i$$

and let us assume that we want to know what effect an increase in age has on Sarvodaya. The magnitude of that effect would be measured by β_1. But it is possible that, according to our estimates, the age variable has no effect on Sarvodaya. How do we know if each of the independent variables influences the Sarvodaya variable? How do we determine its magnitude?

Let us return to the results of the multivariate model (Figure 10).

Figure 10

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3,491	,261		13,356	,000
	age	,004	,009	,012	,416	,677
	gender	,095	,055	,051	1,715	,087
	marital_status	-,040	,056	-,021	-,722	,471
	relationships	**,074**	**,036**	**,061**	**2,066**	**,039**
	nature_connection	**,226**	**,043**	**,159**	**5,213**	**,000**
	political_orientation	**-,097**	**,015**	**-,197**	**-6,583**	**,000**

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

We would like to know which variables are significant in our model. In other words, which variables contribute to predict the Sarvodaya variable. The information needed to know this is provided by the last column of the table. If the value in the sig column is less than 0.1 (or 0.05 or 0.01, depending on the criterion chosen by the researcher), then the variable to which that value corresponds is significant.

But let us see how this statement is based. The t-statistic for each variable, in the penultimate column, tests the null hypothesis that each regression coefficient is zero in the population ($H_0: \beta = 0$), and this column includes the p-value of each of the t-tests. The significance or non-significance of each variable depends, to some extent, on the researcher's criterion of choice. A common criterion is to accept that a variable is significant when we cannot accept the null hypothesis with a 95% probability (p-value<0.05). This implies that we should take seriously the variables in our model whose p-value is less than 0.05 and discard the rest. These variables are marked in bold in Figure 10.

In figure 10 we have two types of coefficients: standardized and unstandardized coefficients. Standardized coefficients indicate the weight of each variable in the model, providing an indicator of the importance of each variable in the model. The higher the absolute value of the standardized

coefficient, the greater its importance. In our example, the variable with the highest importance is the political orientation variable, followed by the connectedness to nature.

The unstandardized coefficients are the ones that allow us to interpret the model, so that we can rewrite it as follows:

$$sarvodaya\ prediction$$
$$= 3,491 + 0,074\ relationships + 0,226\ nature\_connection$$
$$- 0,097\ political\_orientation$$

Note that we have set the value of zero to those coefficients whose p-value was higher than 0.05.

Quantitative variables are interpreted as follows: A one-unit increase in an independent variable is equivalent to an increase in the dependent variable in the magnitude of the coefficient, assuming that all other variables remain constant.

$$sarvodaya\ prediction$$
$$= 3,491 + 0,074\ relationships + 0,226\ nature\_connection$$
$$- 0,097\ political\_orientation$$

Thus, in the case of the *relationships* variable, by increasing it by one unit, the predicted Sarvodaya variable increases by a magnitude of 0.074 as long as everything else remains constant. Whether the dependent variable increases or decreases as an independent variable increases depends on the sign of the coefficient.

The dichotomous variables or dummy variables, of which we have so far spoken rather little, are variables that take a value of 0 or 1, and which have special characteristics in terms of their interpretation and specification, as we are going to see in this section.

The dummy variables in our model are gender and marital status. However, the model estimates that none of them is significant at the 95% confidence level. If we were to set a 90% confidence level, the gender variable would be significant and the prediction model would look like this:

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$$sarvodaya\ prediction$$
$$= 3{,}491 + 0{,}095\ gender + 0{,}074\ relationships + 0{,}226\ nature\_connection$$
$$- 0{,}097\ political\_orientation$$

The interpretation of gender would be as follows. When the gender variable goes from a value of 0 to 1, the forecast value of the Sarvodaya variable increases by 0,095. In other words, if the respondent is a woman, the prediction is that the value of the Sarvodaya variable will increase by 0,095.

The value of β_0 estimated as 3,491 is known as the estimated value of the constant or the estimated value of the intercept. The intercept could be attributed to the part of the model that is not affected by the variations of the variables, nor is it attributable to the error term, so it is considered as the constant part of the model.

V. INTRODUCTION OF VARIABLES IN THE MODEL

Each of the variable typologies is treated differently in the model. Let us see in the following lines how the variables should be introduced according to the different types.

V.1 How to introduce certain variables?

When inserting variables, the case of qualitative variables is different, because of what has been seen in the interpretation and because of what will be discussed in the following section on perfect multicollinearity. Let us imagine a qualitative variable, as for example the following:

Profession:

- 1 if he is a plumber
- 2 if he is a farmer
- 3 if he is a notary

Suppose we want to estimate a linear regression model, in which we want to explain the individual annual income variable (in thousands of euros per year) with the profession of each individual. As a result, we obtain that the profession variable is significant and we can formulate the following estimated model: $income\ prediction = 0,45 - 1,9\ profession.$

According to the estimated model, when the profession "decreases", income increases. Thus, when moving up the profession scale, income decreases by €1900. But this predicts well the influence of profession on income. In fact, what would have happened if we had changed the scale in this way?

Profession:

- 1 if plumber

- 2 if notary

- 3 if farmer

Does this estimate raise any problems? Are we really estimating correctly?

V.2 The variables Dummy

Let us imagine, on the other hand, that we design the following model:

$$income = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_1 + \beta_2 D_2 + \varepsilon,$$

where D_1 and D_2 are a transformation of the variable profession, as follows:

D_1:

- 1 if notary

- 0 otherwise (plumber or farmer)

D_2:

- 1 if plumber

- 0 otherwise (notary or farmer)

After estimating the model, we obtain that only the first variable is significant, and with the value of the coefficient of the first variable we can formulate the following model (D_2 does not appear because we cannot reject the hypothesis that its coefficient is zero):

$$income\ prediction = 0{,}3 + 23{,}4D_1$$

Here, by interpreting the model, we can draw much more reasonable conclusions than in the previous case. If the respondent is a notary, he would generally earn 23400 euros per year more than if he were from any of the other professions.

The variables D_1 and D_2 are known as dummy variables, and are categorical variables that are worth 1 in a given case and 0 in other case(s).

We can also design D_3:

D_3:

- 1 if farmer

- 0 otherwise (he is a plumber or notary)

and estimate any of these alternative models:

$income = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_1 + \beta_2 D_3 + \varepsilon$, or the model:

$income = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_2 + \beta_2 D_3 + \varepsilon$

What we cannot do is estimate the following model:

$income = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_1 + \beta_2 D_2 + \beta_3 D_3 + \varepsilon$,

since we would have a problem of perfect collinearity. This is an issue that we discuss later.
In our example of Sarvodaya, we have two dummies, which are: gender and marital status.

VI. COLLINEARITY

Collinearity is associated with the correlation between the independent variables of a model. There are two types of collinearity: partial collinearity or perfect collinearity.

In the following lines we will deal with both types of collinearity as we have been doing so far: through our example of Sarvodaya.

VI.1 Perfect collinearity

Let's look at perfect collinearity through an example. Let's take our previous model:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \varepsilon_i$$

And let us create an indicator which can be the following: $indicator = 0,5 \times relationships + 0,5 \times nature\_connection$. We can create this variable as shown in Figure 11 (we must select "Transform" $\rightarrow$ "Compute Variable" to display this window).

Figure 11

Then we can estimate the following model:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \beta_7 indicator + \varepsilon_i$$

Once the estimation has been carried out, SPSS in making this estimation has excluded one variable among these three: relationships, nature_connection and indicator. In our case, the excluded variable was relationships, and Figure 12 appears among the results:

Figure 12

Excluded Variables[a]

| Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
1	relationships	.[b]	.	.	.	,000

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), indicator, marital_status, political_orientation, age, gender, nature_connection

This is because there is a problem of perfect collinearity. A variable is a linear combination of others (in our case, indicator is a linear combination of relationships and nature_connection), and due to a mathematical reasoning that we will ignore here, it is not possible to make the estimation if at least one of them is not eliminated.

As emphasized before, when dummy variables are included in the estimation of a linear model, at least one of them must be omitted. For example, we can design a dummy variable that is the inverse of our gender variable, so that it takes a value of 1 when the respondent does not identify with the female gender.

A trick to calculate the variable quickly is to create the variable non_female by subtracting the unit from gender and multiplying by (-1), as shown in Figure 13.

Figure 13:

When estimating the following model:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \beta_7 non\_female + \varepsilon_i$$

The same thing happens as in the previous case: a variable has been subtracted due to a problem of perfect collinearity. In this case, the excluded variable has been gender (Figure 14).

Figure 14

Excluded Variables^a

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics Tolerance
1	gender	.^b	.	.	.	,000

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), non_female, age, relationships, marital_status, political_orientation, nature_connection

VI.2 Partial collinearity

Partial collinearity, or simply collinearity, occurs when there are high correlations between the independent variables of an equation and this affects the coefficient estimates to a high degree. Partial collinearity poses a somewhat more complex problem than perfect collinearity, among other things because it is not detectable with the naked eye. Another problem with collinearity is that the estimated coefficients are unstable: changes in some observation (e.g., removing a single case) produce large changes in the estimated coefficients. In addition to this phenomenon, another sign of collinearity that we can sometimes find is the existence of a high R-squared and few significant variables in the model.

But what is the criterion for determining that correlations are high? The answer is that there is no criterion: researchers do not agree when determining when they are high or low. If the correlations between two variables are high, close to 1 or -1, then we can think that collinearity will exist when they are found as independent variables in the model. However, there is no determined value from which we can say that they are high or low, and if there is, it is determined by the researcher with a not very objective criterion. When estimating a linear regression, the SPSS program can provide us with the value of the so-called condition indices, which are indicators derived from a principal component analysis of the independent variables, whose reasoning is somewhat complex and therefore we omit them.

When these condition indices are high for some variables, it means that there are problems of collinearity. But when are they high? There is no standard criterion. When these indices are below 15, we can think that the collinearity is not high, and when they are further away from this limit, we can suspect the existence of this problem. However, we insist, this 15 is an arbitrary value; other researchers propose other lower levels as a cut-off, or even higher. There are as many condition indices as there are variables; the problem is that this method does not express the variables involved in the collinearity.

Another way to test for collinearity is through the variance inflation factor (VIF). For each variable, when this factor is high, we say that this variable can create collinearity problems. But when is it

high enough to create such problems? When it exceeds 10, we can suspect that this variable can indeed create a collinearity problem. The tolerance indicator is equal to the inverse of the VIF. Let's see if collinearity problems exist in our model:

$$sarvodaya = \beta_0 + \beta_1 age + \beta_2 gender + \beta_3 marital\_status + \beta_4 relationships$$
$$+ \beta_5 nature\_connection + \beta_6 political\_orientation + \varepsilon_i$$

When estimating, we can choose in the "Statistics" tab that the estimations include a diagnosis of collinearity (Figures 15 and 16).

Figure 15

Figure 16

The new tables that appear are included in Figures 17 and 18.

Figure 17

Coefficientsᵃ

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	3,491	,261		13,4	,000		
	age	,004	,009	,012	,416	,677	,967	1,034
	gender	,095	,055	,051	1,715	,087	,954	1,048
	marital_status	-,040	,056	-,021	-,722	,471	,974	1,027
	relationships	,074	,036	,061	2,066	,039	,966	1,036
	nature_connection	,226	,043	,159	5,213	,000	,903	1,107
	political_orientation	-,097	,015	-,197	-6,58	,000	,937	1,068

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

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Figure 18

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions						
				(Constant)	age	gender	marital_ status	relation ships	nature_co nnection	political_o rientation
1	1	6,112	1,000	,00	,00	,01	,01	,00	,00	,00
	2	,421	3,810	,00	,00	,50	,34	,00	,00	,01
	3	,270	4,756	,00	,00	,38	,62	,01	,00	,06
	4	,128	6,918	,00	,01	,09	,00	,01	,03	,78
	5	,037	12,873	,00	,07	,00	,00	,88	,09	,02
	6	,024	15,818	,01	,34	,01	,00	,00	,75	,05
	7	,008	28,270	,98	,58	,01	,04	,10	,12	,08

a. Dependent Variable: sarvodaya

In the first table of Figure 17 we see that the VIFs are not high for any variable, all are well below 10. The fourth column of the second table (Figure 18) is of interest to us since it shows the condition indices. We note that two of them exceed the value of 15.

The problem of collinearity is not simple because the limits are not very clear. This is an issue that generates debate among researchers. However, there are limits that go beyond any debate: if the correlation of two independent variables is around 0.9, this level would obviously be too high. If it is above 0.1, then it is too low to generate a problem. If the condition indices are greater than 15 we could speak of the existence of high collinearity; and if they are less than 5 we can be sure that there is no collinearity. If the VIF is much greater than 10, we can be sure that this variable will give problems of collinearity.

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4. Digital research in the reconciliation process

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I. RECONCILIATION PROCESSES COHABITATED IN INTERNET COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (ICT)

Reconciliation Processes has a long history since the end of World War II, worth mentioning to remind the reader of events that have characterized the historical reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict. As nations were at the time responsible for heinous crimes in history, that was dealt with reconciliation processes that developed good relationships with their former enemies, perpetrators, and victims and could change the minorities into majorities towards the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict (Liener, 2016). The reference work is done towards the reconciliation process following some historical events. Such as the one that happened in Tokyo on March 9, 2015, on an event organized by the left-leaning newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, where Angela Merkel (German Bundeskanzler), the councilor of Germany at the time, referred to a speech in the year of (1985) done by then West German president Richard von Weizsäcker, who called Germany's wartime in world war two defeat a "Day of Liberation." Merkel also added that "We Germans will never forget the hand of reconciliation that was extended to us after all the suffering that our country had brought to Europe and the world" (Rienzi, 2015).

It is also good to reference the "*Kniefal" l* that took place in Warsaw in Poland when signing the treaty of Warsaw, known as *Kniefall von Warschau* (1970); most of the events that were promoting reconciliation processes became an alternative way for conflict resolutions—introducing reconciliation process that investigated alternative ways to conflict transformation in conflicts—such as peacebuilding and reconciliation process, methods, strategies, and practices into conflict as a different variable of conflicts, adhering for conflict transformation for stagnated protracted conflicts.

According to Hanns Maul, a German leading academic foreign policy analyst, and professor of strategic studies, a reconciliation process starts with coping with the past, such as the German experience, which started in the 1950s. The most noted event was the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials that took place in 1963 until 1965. The reason that those cases against Nazis were significant, it was held by Germans and not by Allies to convict Germans; it was one of the most major war crime cases that took to condemn Germans for their actions in war times against enemies. Including soldiers who served in the concentration camps, which were brought to justice and were accountable for their actions. German Reconciliation Process is painted with gargantuan awkwardness, the feeling of guilt of a nation for atrocities committed in World War II against several nations. German leadership such as Konrad Adenauer, such as his reconciliation process with Israel and with the Jewish Nation, Willy Brandt with his Reconciliation with Poland, set the path for Reconciliation Process with victim nations and their enemies in war, were Brandt said: "No German is Free of History" (Rienzi, 2015).

Another example was in January 1963, At the Franco-German Youth Office, French President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer signed the "Élysée Treaty" that established a new foundation for relations and ended centuries of rivalry between both old enemies. According to Gardner Feldman, in her book, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity* (2014) That the German policies relied on developing reconciliation processes with its former nations for atrocities committed by German Nazis, adhering rights of Germans to accept the guilt for crimes committed in their names against their old and present enemies. The reason for reconciliation processes is to develop German's economic and political relations with other former enemies, stating, and she stated that: "German policies after World War II became reconciliation progressively" (Rienzi, 2015).

We also must not forget the German did not forget to forge the **reconciliation process** with various enemies of the past. German continued its reconciliation process through educational centers and institutions, as they are taking parts until the present time, such as reconciliation process with England, Netherlands, France, Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic, Cyprus.

Reconciliation is a process that has a broad meaning for the understanding of the word, as it conjugates to many different aspects in different domains to construct peaceful relations. Reconciliation "is the restoration of relationships between individuals, groups, states after the violence, war, genocide, civil war, gross human rights violations like segregations (Apartheid), enslavement, or similar activities. Reconciliation as policy requires a long term strategy with many practices with multiple levels," according to Leiner (2016: 183), developing a process for Reconciliation in the middle of conflicts, later introducing the "Holderlin Perspective". Reconciliation Processes in ICT are focusing more on alternative conflict transformation and transitional shifts researching peacebuilding, conflict transformation, and reconciliation processes. In addition to encounter conflicts and research the reconciliation process, to develop aspects known as "shared common future between enemies in the middle of conflicts," including researching reconciliation Processes into the other conflicts in various locations and disciplines, making an in-depth, thorough investigation into its processes, its achievements, and its impact, past and future into conflicts, and developing close to the deep divide between enemies in the middle of a conflict, developing the term "Inclusive Reconciliation process."

Internet Communication Technology (ICT) became the developing mean for research domains in our modern times, and to be integrated into many different disciplines of research. The article focuses on exploring ICT research in reconciliation processes as an alternative way for conflicts transformation and as a mean for researching peacebuilding and reconciliation processes into conflicts in regards to its methods, strategies, and practices, even in adhering into social, cultural, economic, and political policies for governments, shared policy decisions and social change in its cultural, economic and political capitals.

Today, ICT focuses on impacting conflict transformation into more alternative ways adhering to peacebuilding & reconciliation processes. ICTs are existing and obtainable applications in researching conflicts and appraising it within its influence on conflict transformation in applying peacebuilding & reconciliation strategies, methods, and practices into the conflicts and in researching conflicts transformation into a more dominant sphere known as the Internet.

There are many variations for reconciliation processes in ICT as in terms of a different approach and theories, ICT embraced the developing of a new era of an interdisciplinary approach for conflict research that inflicted reconciliation processes into conflict transformation into different varieties of disciplines in social science research and advancing those reconciliation process into more inter-trans-multi – disciplines research.

In our present time, Reconciliation Processes cohabitated with ICTs are researched as an alternative study towards developing an interactive communication of knowledge about theories and methods of peace, conflict transformation, and reconciliation practices. ICT would emphasize more on peacebuilding research towards conflict transformation through researching reconciliation processes in different areas, locations, and time impacting social, economic, and political capitals in conflicts, bridging the digital divide and the enemies' conflict divisions in conflicts. The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies in Jena, in Germany, adopted the notion of the "*Hölderlin Perspective*" the concepts for Reconciliation, emphasizing on Reconciliation during conflicts, as Leiner (2016) explained in his book *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*, the book explains "*Hölderlin Perspective";* for the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843), wrote in his novel "Hyperion:" "Versohnung ist mitten in Streit und all Getrennte find sich wide*r*" (Leiner & Flamig, 2020: 8-18). In English, it is translated as "Reconciliation is in the middle of the strife and all that was separated finds each other again." (Friedrich Hölderlin, 2004, p. 169). This notion adopts that Reconciliation can be part of conflict transformation that has a transitional shift towards peaceful relations within the conflict. Reconciliation is known to many scholars that it always requires the support of the majority of society to be possible. However, in the aspect of the "Hölderlin perspective," Reconciliation requires to be in the middle of conflict and can work even within the minority to change them into the majority. Reconciliation has a holistic combination as an outcome, and as a process, both are combined in a recurrence action in accords to establish an effect on both parties in conflict.

The main focus of ICT in the reconciliation Process is to reach validity and lasting sustainability for the reconciliation process, developing a better-shared future between enemies. Digital research in the reconciliation process is merely a process that takes a path towards reconciliation path in the middle of conflict, that provides and introduce mutual recognition and knowledge for the narrative

of the other, and "bridging relations of cohabitation for former enemies," recognizing their interest and goals, providing to mutual trust, mutual recognition, developing cultural, economic, political relations, and respecting the sensitivity and consideration of the other parties needs and interests, within bridging the conflict divide in conflicts between enemies. Digital research in the reconciliation process can cohabitate within groups that conflict in many aspects, such as in cultural, political, and economical capitals. Also, in the inner group or inner state, both groups get united in their political-economical cultural systems and develop a single political entity. Nevertheless, in conflicts between nations, it becomes a relation between two states that has the acceptance and the recognition of the other, to apologize for each other for past adversaries and atrocities, restoring good relations with good intentions, and develop a political restructuring of former relations with the assistance of ICT to bridge the divide between enemies in conflicts such as in nations and communities.

The reconciliation process in ICT calls for restructuring mechanisms of social, cultural, economic, and political spheres. This restructured system can be implemented on both outer-groups and inner groups. Reconciliation between two states, and within the inner-groups Reconciliation within to entities of states. ICTs in reconciliation processes links a mean to investigate the cause of violence and violence prevention in conflicts and research the paths towards possibilities of transforming conflicts into introducing a shared common better future between enemies, or develop transitional shifts within protracted and intractable conflicts, developing digital research in the reconciliation process, this type of reconciliation mechanism approaches inclusivity in its impact and reference it as "Inclusive Reconciliation Process".

Digital Research in reconciliation process would bring tangible experiences of peaceful cohabitation and opportunities for the stabilization and enhancement of non-violent conflict resolution and prevention strategies, mechanisms, and processes into intractable conflicts, advancing into impacting frozen conflicts or progressive conflicts or protracted conflicts or affecting change in frozen peace processes between enemies within the conflict elements of the division or developing economical trade towards development for the reconciliation process, one has to be hesitant with the ideas, between development and Reconciliation, one does not negate

the other, but with Reconciliation, development can prosper. However, development without Reconciliation can develop calmness before wars.

Digital Research for Reconciliation Processes is considered transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and multidisciplinary approaches to Research. Its adheres to its theoretical and methodological approach within the cohabitations of various disciplines that develop intercultural social change; in integrating knowledge about different concepts, theories, institutions, and instruments of peacebuilding, conflict transformation, and transitional shifts within reconciliation processes applying strategies, methods, and practices, which is considered as part of the path for the alternative way for conflict transformation and transitional shifts in conflicts in our present time.

Reconciliation Processes influenced by ICTs ignite and exposes human rights policies, and introduce the development of analytical and practical skills in effective conflict management towards conflict transformation and shits of transitions for peacebuilding, peacemaking, peacekeeping, violent prevention into reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts. Digital Research in reconciliation processes cohabitate theories of international relations and cooperation between entities or enemies in conflict. It also integrates philosophical, ethical, psychological, sociological, anthropological, information technologies, and Internet communication technologies components for the purpose altered above.

Also, Digital research for reconciliation processes develops peaceful forms that thrive educational, cultural, and political spheres, to assist in redefining the context of conflicts with the transformation and transitions, where one ruled by majority averting violence, violence prevention, and overdue the progress of conflicts in the future, develop shared common future for enemies in conflicts.

ICT in Digital research are means and ends for advancing peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peacemaking into the process of Reconciliation in the middle of conflicts. ICT in reconciliation processes develops strategies and methods to overcome the impasse in social, political, or regional conflicts in analyzing and interpreting their causes, researching different approaches for conflict

transformation and transitional shifts to develop "Inclusive Reconciliation" that adheres to conflict resolution and build a common shared future in conflicts.

Digital Research in the reconciliation process can evaluate political strategies and ongoing projects in the fields of security, international law, violence prevention, reconciliation studies, and human rights; and to propose alternative methods of conflict transformation and develop transitional shifts such as peacebuilding and Reconciliation methods, practices in researching and understanding the cause of conflicts in impacting a wide range of stakeholders in conflict to develop the transition needed in the middle of conflicts towards reconciliation process.

II. RECONCILIATION PROCESS METHODS IN DIGITAL RESEARCH

ICT can enforce reconciliation methods as part of digital Research, and they are as follows according to Al-Dajani (2020: 85-88):

1. ICT to endorse apology.

    Apology illustrates confrontation with the past and taking responsibility for the actions done during the conflicts or after the conflicts or by admitting to atrocities done in the past. If this type is not dealt with, Reconciliation is not possible because each party portrays themselves as the victims, harboring negative feelings; those negative feelings might result in instigating new conflict. As Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) stated, an "apology is a formal acceptance for responsibility for misdeeds carried out during the conflict and an appeal to the victims for forgiveness. It implies pursuing justice and truth" (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004: 29). ICT can contribute to developing apologies through online social networks such as in Forms, You-Tube, and Video and other ICT applications. For example, it can be a unilateral apology using different ICT applications where they express sorrow about what happened during the conflict and in the past, recognize apologies and Empathy with the other, through online apologies using You-Tube channels and other means of ICTs.

ICT can be a means to express forgiveness by accepting apologies in online social media between the perpetrators and their victims.

2. Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRC) within online social media.

The commissions are a way to deal with the atrocities done in the past by revealing the truth about what happened in the past and represent it in the present time. It is considered a mechanism to serve justice for victims of past atrocities such as in South Africa TRC. In this act, compensation is not possible, but it reveals acts of violence, discriminations, violations of human rights, and other deeds of racism in the conflict. Some of the aims of the truth and reconciliation commission involve establishing a comprehensive record for the cause of the brutal acts, nature, and the extent of the violation of human rights. Those TRC gave amnesty to perpetrators, as they became part of the victimhood for their disclosure of violent acts in a political context. TRC worked on restoring the dignity of the victims by allowing them to recount their experiences and share these. Lastly, this involves preventing human rights violations and recommending measures for reparations. ICT can help find experts in (TRC) using online search engines, and find other cases, including witnesses, perpetrators, and victims, by locating them online and spreading information to millions of viewers of the TRC. ICT can be mean in developing acknowledgment and recognition for atrocities done by the perpetrators and recognize regrets for the suffering of the other.

3. Public trials.

The public trials are a significant part of the reconciliation process, bringing a perpetrator to justice who committed human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This method aims to acknowledge and reveal the suffering of the victim and to recognize the violent acts done by the perpetrator. When trials are carried out, and the perpetrator receives punishment, a type of retribution occurs for the victim; therefore, justice was carried out. However, those trials are subject to only the perpetrator and not the group, which allows them to be a part of the reconciliation process. ICT can make the trials public and exposed to all audiences and exposing

4. Reparations:

    This method is most appealing in the reconciliation process, as it requests both parties to take responsibility for wrongdoing and to compensate the victims of this atrocity committed by the two entities in the conflict. This method indicates the admission of guilt and the recognition for the suffering of the other, where the victim is willing to forgive his or her perpetrator. ICT with its online media can develop a medium for donations to support reconciliation processes, for example, buying shoes for the kids in Gaza, which happened in 2014, some Israelis have paid for it, even it is in the middle the Israeli- Palestinian conflict.

5. Writing a shared history.

    The method calls for recreating the history of the past, as agreed on by the parties who conflicted, the past that can be learned from its atrocities, and the idea of "never again". It takes historians from both sides to agree on a shared history and to negotiate an agreed past of events for both nations that conflict. It also provides a basis for a new collective memory, which leads toward Reconciliation. ICT can document archives for the history and memories of nations that conflict using online media and online video archives or online research hubs. ICT can develop a shared history with nations in conflict by building a blog with documents, photos, and videos, as both store their memories and histories online, which develops an understanding of the narrative of the other, and closer to Empathy.

6. ICT in Education.

    This method is essential, as it is the only way to change the psychological barriers of the past, thereby promoting Reconciliation. Education can involve peace studies and reconciliation studies to influence the students and members of society. Education constructs the students' ways of thinking, such as their values, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, skills, and behaviors that endorse the reality for the reconciliation process,

preparing them to live in an era of peace and Reconciliation. ICT can expose reconciliation theories, and Digital Research in Reconciliation Practice Develop online courses to teach the reconciliation process. ICT can help explore reconciliation methods, theories, and practices.

7. Hashtags; is a way that ICT connects ideas in online social media such as Facebook, Twitter, You-Tube, LinkedIn online platforms.

> ICT can bridge communication between nations in conflict, as it can help expose its views, presenting it on the Internet, and help widespread it all over the globe. Today, ICT is electronic and part of daily human life, as it is part of people's mobility, social, communicative, and political habits. ICT can be used to spread information about new strategies for Reconciliation that can influence nations in conflict. Most importantly, ICT serves as a channel for communication to send messages for peace and Reconciliation to different rivals in conflict. For example, on October 27, 2017, A Beirut and Telaviv were chosen as the best tourism cities to be visited in the Middle East. A beirute.com, a media company, tweeted, "Please remove us from this Narrative." The Tweet went viral; the Mossad Hashtagged hashtag (#TelAvivLovesBeirut) went viral, and Lebanon rejected it very negatively because they did not want their city to be affiliated with Tel-Aviv. This kind of communication, which is in the open domain of the Internet, went viral to everyone around the world; this kind of message can be sent over the Internet to express the need to reconcile with the other. Also, it illustrates the strength of the Internet and that it can bring strong rivals to communicate with each other.

8. Published meetings between presentations of the group who conflict.

> When conflicted groups have joint meetings with their leaders or their academics, it should be published. That illustrates that both groups are working for Reconciliation. For example, in October 2017, Tzipi Livni, the Minister of Justice in the Israeli government, requested for recognition on her official page. She wanted Israelis and Palestinians to cooperate for peace to fight crimes of terrorism and denounce that the Israeli prime minister, who keeps saying there is no one to have peace with, is working

with Palestinians as a countermeasure against terrorism. The Israeli and the Palestinians are meeting together to provide security for both nations. These kinds of meetings, if announced, illustrate that both are working to better the lives of their people, which can be an aspect of the reconciliation process; if published, it would be a better aspect to spread that there is a process for Reconciliation in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

9. Exposing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) empirical work for the reconciliation process.

Non-governmental organizations, either from NGOs that are part of the society or from an international community, can contribute to the process of Reconciliation. NGOs can illustrate that peace relations can bring benefits to societies in conflict, such as by spreading messages about the importance of the reconciliation process, about the prosperity of Reconciliation, and the benefits of having peaceful relations with past enemies. ICT can help connect NGOs that are against the war to develop communication within each other, such as what happened between Israel and Lebanon, where some NGOs were against the war.

10. Online Joint projects

Those projects are significant, as these can help bridge barriers between enemies who conflict by facilitating and researching psychological Reconciliation. It can connect members of two groups from different levels of societies in the same project. This provides opportunities for different members from different nations in conflict to have personal encounters, which would foster the understanding of the narrative of the other and would teach them about peace relations, as well as why it is crucial for both nations.

11. Culture exchange using ICT.

ICT can help nations in conflict exchange cultures by online videos and other interactive chat applications. This exchange can help each opponent in conflict learn about the other, such as through translating books, visiting artists, and learning

academics from different conferences, exhibitions, and festivals. ICT uses games and other online documentaries to help expose other cultures that conflict.

12. Enhancing Empathy using ICT.

> Enhancing Empathy in conflict, using virtual reality in ICT to expose different perspectives on what is happening in the conflict. There was a presentation in Jena on September 4, 2018, presented by Eran Halpine, where he used virtual reality to expose different perspectives on the same scene of a checkpoint from the different views of a soldier, a Palestinian, and a neutral observer. They found that it increases more Empathy with the Palestinians when observed from the Palestinian perspective.

In the next section, the research explores more on Applied Phronesis, an Aristotelian concept that can be applied online, using Internet Communication Technologies ICT, and explains the evolution of using Applied Phronesis in Social Science for (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The section also explores cohabitating Applied Phronesis in ICT to influence the conduct of the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict.

## III. APPLIED PHRONESIS FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH IN RECONCILIATION PROCESS

Appling an Aristotelian philosophy (Phronesis), meaning prudent, to reach the high level of wisdom, accredited to the Research of applied Phronesis in social science to (Flyvbjerg, 2001) and implement the Reconciliation Process in Applied Phronesis in social sciences (Flybjerg et al. 2013) in addition to applying ICT for the cohabitation in developing from theory to practice towards reconciliation process accredited to (Al-Dajani 2020).

The theoretical method is to apply the "Holderlin perspective" Reconciliation in the middle of a conflict with its methods and strategies to thrive societies that are in a protracted conflict towards the reconciliation process by Applied Phronesis identified as reaching the prudent level of wisdom in the middle of the conflict.

The Figure 1 illustrates the Theoretical Framework Foundation for Digital Research in the Reconciliation Process.

Figure 1

To explore this phenomenology, Flyvbjerg (2001) calls for the "*Phronimos*," which are agents that start the interaction relationship between the two parts, the Episteme, and the Techne. Flyvbjerg introduces the power relation with knowledge, "knowledge leads to power, and power leads to knowledge" (Flyvbjerg 2001: 89).

The Figure 1 illustrates two aspects, how to develop conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards the reconciliation process for societies in the middle of conflicts. The participants who held the ultra-dynamic force for change about the power of change for social change are applying the power relation to advance social change between the know-how and the how-to that is attracting towards the reconciliation process. In this context, the Phronimos are the agent and is part of the conflict and a participant in the Reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts, which

develops the power for social change towards the reconciliation process by the cohabitation of the know-how and the how-to as illustrated knowledge about Reconciliation and ICT cohabitation process combined and integrated reaching the path toward reconciliation process.

It is the evolvement of different participants to develop knowledge know-how and the how-to towards the reconciliation process, developing at the end of the tunnel a base society that thrives in a reconciliation process in the middle of conflict towards peacebuilding, conflict transformation, affecting real communities in conflict to resolve their disputes and find a better path towards a better future for their children. (Al-Dajani & Leiner, 2019).

After understanding the reconciliation process, and the Applied Phronesis, and how ICT is part of the tool to combine both into a theoretical thesis, where Reconciliation is the episteme level of knowledge and the Techne is the how-to ICT platforms, with power dynamics of interchange, applied on cultures into a spiral mode, powering change towards the reconciliation process. The next section would explain more on the how-to method; the theoretical synthesis described conducted, and explaining the power dynamics for such a procedure.

IV. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH IN RECONCILIATION PRACTICE

The Phenomenology of ICT in Applied Phronesis for Reconciliation Process (Al-Dajani, 2020:89) illustrates ICT in Phronetic social science, cohabitating a Phronetic approach into ICTs applications for social change towards the practices of reconciliation strategies and mechanism to into societies or conflicts towards shifts for transitions into the Reconciliation Process in the middle of conflicts. To illustrate a more cohesive version of this approach, here is the description of the theoretical framework, according to Al-Dajani (2020:47).

The Applied Phronesis approach in ICT develops an online social medium that keeps on running forever to develop social change towards the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict and to empower the process in an ultra-dynamic change within participants. To achieve an ultra-

dynamic approach in Phronesis, the researcher had to find the element-of-power that resided in social science during the interactives and the power that would continue the process. In this Research, ICT was the core and the element of power, according to principles stated (Al-Dajani, 2020:47). The element of power must always be ultra-dynamic, which means the power of inflicting exchange of ideas from one participant to another, which makes the core always dynamic and changing and not dependent on one situation or one person. This theory is depending on the power relations be Nietzsche *"The will to power (***Kevin Hill** R 2017) and integrating it with the theories of "active communication theory" for Habermas and the "practice Theory" for Berdue, combining them develops the interaction an ongoing communication between entities in conflict exchange the power of knowledge and the power of action, to reaches prudence, Phronesis. Please see the Figure below for illustration.

Figure 3 Applied Phronesis in Internet Communication Technologies

Al-Dajani 2020: 245

In our case, ICT is the element of power; strengthening this element develops the recursive influence on society that leads to social change. The element of power should be ultra-dynamic, which means it changes over time, self-empower for change, and exchanges from one entity to another, where no participant has the ultimate power, and it switches from one environment to another. ICT can be in recursive influence between participants, the positive and the negative, for example, the stakeholders and participants in the reconciliation processes. That develops friction of power from the practice of participants and adheres to social change "Practice Theory" Burdeu. ICT can expose and expand the developing tension, and that tension leads to a problem, and the problem leads to reason and leads to social change that must happen to relieve the tension. This recursive ultra-dynamic approach self-empowering social change in society and this is the core of the phenomenology of ICT in Phronetic social science (Al-Dajani 2020:247).

Figure 3 social change phenomena with ICT

Al-Dajani 2020: 246

The Figure illustrates the cycle from necessary issue information to profile group transformation, where groups begin to develop their profiles following their necessary information. After the intervention of ICTs, it directs the content of the communication to the conflict transformation between users, which develops a structural transformation that influences the substance of the conflict. The Figure below demonstrates the effect of ICT platforms on the characteristics of conflict transformation. According to Pool (1983), ICT Platforms "is a technology of freedom since it enhances the freedom of choice for individuals and intensifies bottom-up relations in networks of organizations and individuals" cited from Hattotuwa. Pool (1983) further stated how the above definition enhanced interaction between the two entities in the conflict in creating new characteristics for the content of the conflict (Al-Dajani 2020: 108-109).

Figure 4. ICT platform from reconciliation Process and social change

- **ICT platform can transform the conflicting such as ideologies of both communities that are in conflict, thus influencing the participants that are using the ICT platform.**

- **ICT will change the structure of the conflict by develop strategies for reconciliation process.**

ICT-> for Conflict Transformation

ICT-> Strategies for Reconciliation

Digital Transitions for reconciliation process

ICTs, Mechanisms for Reconciliation

- **ICT develops a transition shift toward reconciliation process in societies in the middle of conflicts.**

- **ICT develop a mechanism for reconciliation process cohabited in conflicts.**

Al-Dajani, 2020:109

The Figure illustrates a conflict transformation and transitional shifts for the reconciliation process, introducing the path from conflict transformation into implementing strategies and reconciliation mechanisms cohabitated in ICT that results in digital transition for the reconciliation process.

The second section described the how-to procedure to apply ICT in the academic sphere and the reconciliation process as part of digital research.

V. METHODOLOGIES IN DIGITAL RECONCILIATION RESEARCH

V.1 Applied Phronesis in a Netnography Approach for Reconciliation Digital Research Process
Netnography approach is utilized to pave the way toward gaining in-depth qualitative and quantitative insight into social network analysis or today's terminology to research such date is referred to as Data Science and the investigation of the research data that would influence the behavior of real online participants in the online data towards the as researching the reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts. Including any type of data that would explore big data such as the online data from the online social network. The data science analysis aims to explore the practice of a participative engagement, self-examination, alternative representation, a new perspective for humanist and hermeneutic online real behavior, and also can be applied to any type of study of data.

Netnography approach focuses on communicative actions and interactions that are a loss over the Internet; these acts can be textual, graphics, photographic, audiovisual, and musical (Kozinets, 2015:80). Kozinets (2015) offered eight advantages for applying the netnography approach, which was interpreted and summarized as follows: The netnography approach can reveal a discourse about hidden and stigmatic behavior, which is not present when studying a natural person's behavior. It is tough to comprehend. When conducting a netnography, the researcher can distance himself from the participants or apply a degree of distance between him and the participants in the Research as he is also a part of the communication interaction. That will give the researcher the ability to distance his judgment, and it would not affect the Research (Kozinets, 2015:88).

Kozinets (2015) stated that netnography was a name *given to a specific set of related data collection, analysis, ethical, and representational research practices, where a significant amount of data collected and participant-observational research conducted originates in and manifested through that data shared freely on the Internet, including mobile applications* (Kozinets, 2015:79).

The Netnography Process (Kozinets, 2015) can be illustrated in five phases of actions:

1. They are redefining research questions after collecting and merging all coded date.
2. Media Mapping, coding, filtering, and communication identifications.
3. Digital Observations, such as engagements, comments, likes, tweets, online social network behavior.
4. Data analysis and Data visualization, iterative process of analysis and interpretation, data from quantitative results might have qualities interpretations,
5. Report research finds and relates to the original hypothesis in the reconciliation research.

Netnography is an approach to study data science; in the approach in digital research for the reconciliation process is more about examining data science and investigate the involvement of such data from a hermeneutic approach that is gathered from the online social media and how it can influence societies toward reconciliation mechanism. In this article it was more to introduce the concept theories and methodology used for such digital research, which can be more explored by the readers.

The next section introduces Mixed-Method Research Design, its how to conduct the research from theory into practice and get concrete results in digital research for the reconciliation process.

V.2 Mixed-Method Research Design for Digital Research in the Reconciliation Process

Mixed-Method Research in Digital Research Design transforms internet datasets into a method to interpret the datasets within qualitative and quantitative integration, gain a more understanding, and exploring the data in the reconciliation process mechanism in the middle of the conflict. The data is being tangible into mixed data, into transitional shifts from quantitative data, transform into qualitative data and keep transformation until illustrate a more understanding results in a transitional shift of the data that ensures the reconciliation process impact and full investigation of the process.

The Figure below introduce a sampler design for Mixed-Method Digital Research Design in Digital Reconciliation research.

Figure 6 ICT Mixed Method Design

Al-Dajani, 2020:204

Steps to for Mixed-Method Digital Research in Reconciliation Processes:

1. Data Source collecting – Data Pools
   a. Gathering online social media content, images, comments, video, tweets from social media such as Facebook, You-Tube-, Twitter.
   b. Gather datasets from social media websites, online forms, online blogs, videos, 2. Comments, Likes.
2. Gather Results about the observation from the online dataset, regarding research questions to investigate the reconciliation process impact.
3. Quantitative data collections, such as gather quantitative data from the datasets regarding the research questions that investigate the study of the reconciliation process.
4. Qualitative Data collections can be from the online content or the previous results of the quantities date as a result of a continuing investigation of the research for the influence of the reconciliation process.
5. Qualitative data analysis techniques, coding in regards to the research questions.
6. Computer-Assisted Qualitative Content Analysis Software CAQCAS: the software assists in collecting, developing analysis procedures, and interpreting the data when applying Qualitative content analysis.
7. Some of the popular software which is used for qualitative content analysis procedure.
   a. Atlas.ti   http://www.atlasti.de/index.html
   b. N6   http://www.qsrinternational.com/
   c. Nvivo for Windows Nvivo12 http://www.qsrinternational.com

d. Maxqda http://www.maxqda.com

8. Analysis Techniques using Nvivo12 for Windows, taking from Nvivo manual for Research using Nvivo:

a. Collecting Qualitative Research Results

b. Developing an analysis procedure using Nvivo 12 for Windows

c. Developing a concept map for the qualitative analysis procedure

d. Conducing the analysis techniques – the inductive and deductive techniques.

e. Developing a journal report

f. Developing results

g. Writing report.

h. Presenting the Qualitative data analysis interpretations report

i. Interpretation must be related to the research questions and hypotheses.

A more specific Mixed-Method Research Design can be illustrated in the Figure be, takes from the book "*ICT for Reconciliation*" (2020).

*Figure 6: Digital Research For Reconciliation Process: online social network analysis*

Al-Dajani, 2020:236

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The concept for the theory of Applied Phronesis in Internet Communication Technologies can be adopted to explore social change in the reconciliation process as well in other disciplines in social science that are using ICT for investigation of the influence of change in research studies and is referred as Digital research for reconciliation studies. For example for applying ICT in Phronetic social science, such as the phenomenology of ICT for social change toward reconciliation process (Al-Dajani, 2020), can be part of the digital research on the reconciliation process; Phronesis is prudent and more taken from Habermas' *The Abstract of the Force for a Better Argument* (Flyvbjerg 2001: 96). The Figure 7 illustrates the digital reconciliation research framework.

Figure 7 Digital Reconciliation Research Theoretical framework

The discourse for the theoretical framework for digital research is the cohabitation of knowledge and technology as one part is integrating into the other to reach Phronesis in the reconciliation process using types of digital platforms. The concept would develop a communicative knowledge of the relationship between two parts, epistemology and Techne, and apply the Habermas appeal for the force of a better argument Phronesis, Prudent. This discourse involved applying reconciliation terminology, philosophy, and techniques that would lead to a social change toward a reconciliation action process cohabitated in digital platforms. The article illustrated how to develop digital research on the reconciliation process from the abstract view into practice and how transitional shifts and conflict transformation can evolve from conducting such research.

*Table 2: Digital Research in the Reconciliation Process*

Methods for the Reconciliation process	Netnography	Social Change	Examples of ICTs
Apology Education Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public Trails Reparations Payments The Work of NGOs Joint Projects	Introspection Investigation Information Interview inspection interaction immersion indexing interpretation iteration instantiation integration	Provide Information	Internet Connectivity Mobile Phone and personal Data assistant. Geographic information systems. forums Radio Chat Videos
Writing a common history Published meetings Truth and reconciliation commissions Public Trails Reparations Payments The Work of NGOs Joint Projects	As the Above	Help People Process Information	Social Network sites, and portals. Data Visualization Tools. Online dispute resolution tools.
Education Public Trails The Work of NGOs Joint Projects	As the Above	Improve decision making	Virtual Command Center. Games and Simulations Online dispute resolution tools.
Education The Work of NGOs Joint Projects	As the Above	Reduce Scarcity	Mobile Phones. The hand-Held portable device, such as iPad, Tablets.
Apology Published meetings. Truth and reconciliation commissions Public Trails Reparations Payments The Work of NGOs Joint Projects	As the Above	Support Relationship	Social Network Tools Online Collaboration tools Mobile Phones Virtual Reality Telecenters.

Apology	As the Above	Help People	Translation Software
Truth and reconciliation		Understand	Blogs.
commissions		Each other	Social Network Tools.
Public Trails			Multimedia
Reparations Payments			
Joint Projects			
The Work of NGOs			

Figure 8: The model of ICT for Social Change in the Reconciliation Process

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Finally, the model described above illustrates the results from digital research in the reconciliation process on culture, political and economic capitals. As a result, one can understand that digital

research can be an instrument one may use to influence conflict transformation and transitional shifts towards crises, develop dialogue in conflicts, Reconciliation, negotiations, coexistence, and peace towards a democratic society.

"Inclusive Reconciliation" is a process of the cohabitating reconciliation process in digital research and applied in digital platforms can reach inclusivity in the reconciliation process in the middle of conflicts and conducted in multi-inter-trans-disciplinary research.

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5. NONVIOLENCE IN PALESTINE / ISRAEL CONTEXTO: CONCEPTUALIZING POPULAR RESISTANCE

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INTRODUCTION

Popular nonviolent resistance in the Palestinian context could be termed as a peaceful political model of liberation and emancipation with far reaching strategic implications and ramifications. It is normal to adopt and activate such model since the conflict with Israel as an occupying power is asymmetrical where there is no balance of forces and neither balance of power between the aggressive and cruel occupier and the non-armed Palestinians on the other hand. Such type of peaceful action on the ground is useful and politically relevant when it is comprehensive and more

mass-oriented approach in the field. Names of activists such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Gene Sharp and Nelson Mandela must be remembered when we politically and intellectually cover the stories and narratives of nonviolence, as they succeeded in bridging the gap between theory and practice.

Boycotts, marches, rallies, signing petitions, fasting and general strikes are common methods of peaceful resistance and peaceful transformations in any context. The choice of means of struggle is the right strategic step in this direction for any nation, people or oppressed communities to regain their stolen rights including freedom, justice and equalities. All international conventions and humanitarian legal foundations guarantee this right of resistance under all circumstances and in varying environments. They grant individuals and peoples the right to resist any colonial occupation or aggressive totalitarian regimes by all available medias, tools and strategies.

Therefore, this essay is intended to achieve the following strategic goals and objectives in the light of Palestinian Israeli conflict theater such as:

1. Deepening the philosophy of implementing popular resistance in Palestine by enriching and stimulating discussions with activists in the field about this type of resistance activities in Palestine.

2. To build a Palestinian model of popular resistance, as it is necessary to take into account the local political realities and the strategic changes concerning resistance and its relationship with political negotiations, where we feel that both should be in harmony or should be integrated or hand in hand.

3. To benefit from the global models and international experiences in nonviolence resistance and to maintain the rhythm of resistance by all available means taking into consideration the ground political and material conditions.

4. To strengthen and consolidate the Palestinian activist's interpretations of principles of Gandhi, Gene Sharp, Mandela and others and to adapt them to local and national conditions to that end.

I. IN DEFINING NONVIOLENCE AND POPULAR RESISTANCE CONCEPTUALLY

Nonviolence is a practice of achieving goals and objectives through symbolic protests, civil disobedience, economic or political noncooperation or other means without physical violence. This type of action highlights the desires, attitudes and intentions of individuals, groups or organized communities to show the need for change something bad or worse or to improve the current situation on the ground (Nazzal & Yousef, 2021:44).

Civil resistance is a powerful and vital way for people to fight for their rights, freedoms, liberties and mundane everyday life conditions without resorting to violence or bloodshed. When people wage peaceful civil disobedience resistance, they utilize tactics such as strikes, boycotts, mass protests, and many other nonviolent tools and actions. People resort to such type of resistance, keeping in mind the final aim of withdrawing their cooperation with unjust aggressive regimes or political systems that exercise violence that systematically infringes human rights to control the masses.

In one way or the other, nonviolence is intervening and overlapping with conflict resolution as the latter is stressing on the process by which two or more parties or groups or sides agree to reach peaceful resolution to their dispute or conflict or to settle their differences by negotiations, arbitrations, mediations or by effective communication and dialogue. Moreover, nonviolence is reflecting the need to go for conflict transformation as dynamic process that entails a response to social conflict movements and flows. Conflict transformation through nonviolence can provide an opportunity for healthy conditions conducive for a constructive process of change through reducing violence. This newly created environment is helpful also in achieving justice and motivating direct dialogue (Nazzal & Yousef, 2021:45).

It is very important to discuss the meaning of violence in order to have a better understanding of its opposite "nonviolence." Semantically, violence is used to refer to any tough, harsh or bloody action that is used against the opponent in order to achieve certain goals, and it is the opposite of peace and mercy. Violence has also been defined idiomatically as the different tools and methods that are used by a certain group against another in order to achieve certain goals that might include

any killing or damage goals. Violence should be the last resort and option that people might go for to resolve the different forms of conflicts. This should be the general role for using violence.

Unfortunately, this is not the case today because many states and even individuals tend to use power to settle their problems and conflicts, especially if they are more powerful than the opponent. Hence, it is very important to realize and deeply understand the massive deconstruction that might be caused by violence which might finally lead to unexpected damage that cannot be resolved and fixed. Thus, violence should always be the last resort for any political and social settlement process (Yousef & Ozcelik, 2021:89-92).

The word 'nonviolent' is defined in the dictionary as "the refuse to use force to bring about political, social or economic changes." It has also been defined differently by socialists and peace activists. Martin Luther King defined it as "a way of life for courageous people that seeks to win friendship and defeat injustice, not people." Up to the point, King tries to state that nonviolent resistance is more directed towards the unjust actions than to those who exercise oppression. It is one of the most sufficient tools in resisting and overcoming all unjust actions. It was also defined by Gandhi as "a strategy for transforming the social attitudes and institutions." Gandhi was different from King in that he presents this form of resistance as a tool and method for transforming the conflict depending on the social and human power. He believes in the capital's power and strength in achieving real changes in the society which would finally help in ending or transforming the conflict. In other words, he thinks that individuals are the main source of real change in any society (Yousef & Ozcelik, 2021:92).

This term has taken various meanings. Common to all definitions, it is the practice of performing peaceful protests, political or economic in-collaboration, and civil disobedience to achieve political and social goals without using violence. It is necessary to avoid using violence and deal with it as a last resort to settle disputes or conflicts at the individual and state levels and even at the community level.

II. MAHATMA GANDHI AND THE INNOVATIVE PIONERING MODEL

The Indian Leader Mahatma Gandhi is a prominent figure in the history of the Indian national movement that primarily changed world history by innovating the concept of nonviolence in theory and practice. His history and contributions to peaceful resistance have been written in golden letters. His positions and stands have been a beacon for those who seek peace, freedom, independence, self-determination, and social and political changes.

If the value of great men emanates from the great positions they have made, then Gandhi, or the great old spirit of Indian *Sanskrit*, occupies a unique place in the recent history of national movements and decolonization. His theory and practice of satyagraha, or non-violent resistance, earned him worldwide praise and recognition. His philosophy of nonviolence "is often seen as the hope of the future, a long-awaited means of peaceful conflict resolution." (Kiltgaard, 1971).

Gandhi dedicated his life to spreading the message and the philosophy of peace and peaceful transformations. He spent more than 50 years preaching and call for peaceful political and social changes. He is the spiritual father of the Indian nation as he led the liberation movement in 1947. Gandhi was the pioneer of *Satyagraha* (truth force) and *Ahimsa* (nonviolence) as sorely needed tools to rebel against all types of oppression. He represents the resistance to tyranny through total peaceful civil disobedience. After India got independence in 1947, Gandhian philosophy turned to be an inspirational model and example for other national liberation movements worldwide (Yousef, Foschi, & Hidalgo, 2020).

Mahatma Gandhi had firmly believed in the power of nonviolence, and he had always thought of it as a strategy to settle the different conflicts at all levels. Unlike other generators of the theory of nonviolence, Gandhi was distinctive in that he ascribed the use of nonviolence with the deep respect of the law. He beheld that people should struggle nonviolently, but at the same time, they have to abide by the different laws to manage their struggle in a civilized and cultured manner.

According to Gandhi, forgiveness and respecting the law are essential elements of nonviolence. This form of resistance could not be used sufficiently if people are unwilling to forgive their opponent, foe, or enemy, or at least forget his cruel deeds against them. For Gandhi, forgiveness

is a core value that should be adopted in any struggle if there is a genuine aspiration to an actual settlement. Forgiveness has liberating aspects to it, as it emancipates the oppressed of their state of victimhood. It grants redemption for those who feel guilty for their actions. Thus it allows broken relationships to heal (Hunter & Rigby, 2009). Nonetheless, Gandhi believed that the right of self-determination, both on individual and collective levels, "required the basic human rights of freedom of speech and association; it also required the fulfilment of basic human needs that could only be achieved through political, social and economic independence." (Hunter & Rigby, 2009) To achieve this goal, Gandhi conceptualized a new type of resistance that adopts nonviolent methods, such as civil disobedience, to stand against the oppressor and the suppressive regimes. The nonviolent action could be utilized to resist the violence of the soldiers, state army, or any other state agencies, whether they belong to security or any other departments. In many cases, civil disobedience has been more effective in facing the suppressive regime than using power or violence; hence the regime cannot justify using power to suppress nonviolent, peaceful acts of resistance, in other words, nonviolent resistance robs the opponent from public support (Tinker, 1971).

Two main types of nonviolent resistance emerged in the previous century. The first type was called philosophical nonviolence, and it refers to the attempts of the oppressed to love the oppressor. Many terms were used to refer to such a relationship: love, hope, forgetting, and forgiveness. All these words were used by those who sought resist the oppressor peacefully. In order to reduce losses on both sides, the oppressed resort to a nonviolent action; from a political point of view, those are usually described as Gandhians. They follow the steps and strategies of Gandhi's passive resistance, a term that refers to the forms of a nonviolent protest against the state - or what is called Gandhian ahimsa (Gandhi). This type or practice of resistance was adopted by many scholars, such as John Lewis and Dr. King.

The second type is tactical nonviolence, which was mainly used to build political power in conflicting areas and fulfill some local and international goals. These two types of resistance complement each other, and they might achieve tangible results if they are used concomitantly in the struggle against oppression.

Gandhi used nonviolent civil disobedience when he was an expatriate lawyer in South Africa. After returning to India in 1915, he organized protests by farmers and workers in urban areas. It was against excessive land taxes and discrimination in treatment (Brown, 1972:41).

Gandhi led national campaigns to eradicate poverty and to fight for women's rights. By eliminating violence, Gandhi sought to establish national harmony, achieve a state of economic self-reliance, which eventually, he believed, would lead to India's Independence. The strength of Gandhi's legacy is a non-discrimination policy between the classes of the Indian society and its ethnic groups. He considered all Indian groups equal and a part of one community. His contribution was immense, directing the struggle of Indians towards their common enemy, British colonialism. He was determined to unite all Indians against their sole oppressor, British rulership, preaching equality and acceptance for all political and religious groups regardless of their differences (Brown, 1972:249).

III. GENE SHARP: ANOTHER MODEL OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

Gene Sharp was born in Ohio in 1928, where he got his early education and early degrees from the Ohio State University. In 1953, during the Korean War, he was jailed for nine months for being a pacifist and opposed to war and the US policy in the Korean peninsula. He spent three years at the Norway Institute of Social Research, where he had the opportunity to get involved in thorough conversations with educators and activists to oppose the local administration engineered by Nazis during the second world war. In 1968 he got his Ph.D. from Oxford University. Later on, he taught at the University of Massachusetts in Dartmouth in the 1970s (Ammons and Coyne, 2018:149-150).

Gene Sharp added remarkable observations regarding the relationship between power and struggle, and he discussed the importance of understanding the governments' sources of power when creating a nonviolent resistance party. Sharp stated that there are two primary schools of power thoughts. The first school refers to the government officials and elites in charge of ruling the

different fields and formal sectors in the country. In any country, this ruling class cannot be easily destroyed because of its formal existence and its association with the official military agencies in the states (Ammons and Coyne, 2018:151).

The approach to power is the paradigm of social power. Sharp remarks that power is usually granted and given to the official and governmental institutions economic elites in the society based on their interests, a common phenomenon, particularly in capitalistic political systems. Rich people usually support any government that saves and sustains their economic interests. This economic class often is not exposed to the same suppressive treatment that ordinary people have to tolerate. Thus, such classes would show more support to the government than the other members of the society (Martin, 1989).

Sharp highlighted several methods of nonviolent resistance that the protestors and peaceful marchers could use to achieve their goals. These methods could be classified as follows:
1. Sit-ins: This could be mainly performed by occupying specific public spaces and squares to break the regular daily life. The aim is to send a message to the second party, usually the government or the occupier, that the people are not satisfied with the political situation. This method was used in the United States of America during the civil rights movement during the 1950s and 1960s.
2. Sit-downs: This is mainly performed by a group of people who are unwilling to comply with a particular decision or situation and want to impose pressure on the government to force it to listen to them. They stage a sitting down in the public streets and refusing to leave them until their demands are met.
3. Student strikes: Students from the universities and schools could perform this by refusing to go to their schools to express their refusal of certain policies. On some occasions, the students go to their schools but refuse to have classes and listen to their teachers.
4. Haunting officials: This refers to an act of following (haunting or chasing) the official figures everywhere they go in order to express the public frustration of their policies.
5. Protests disrobing: This method of nonviolent resistance is not accepted in the Arab World because Arabs are highly biding with their religious and traditional values, but it might take place in some Western countries. It is performed by a group of people who take off

their clothes in public areas to express their refusal of policies that violate their freedom rights.

According to Sharp, governments derive power from various resources. Authority is one of the pillar resources of power because it systematically demarcates between the rulers and the ruled. Another crucial source that feeds into authoritarian power is the elite classes, who benefit from the system economically and socially. Up to a point, it is essential to understand that the social, academic, and financial status of those who support the governing system plays a pivotal role in backing up the regime. If this group is educated and well-skilled, then the government will gain more power.

Moreover, the religious and cultural environment may also contribute to the power of the ruling class. Sharp's framework analysis suggests that people are naturally inclined to obey those who have both powers of physical punishment and psychological persuasion (Martin, 1989: 213-214).

IV. PALESTINIAN FIELD MODEL: ACTIVISTS PERSPECTIVES

The situation in Palestine has a dynamic edge, and it can generate various forms of resistance, including strikes, boycotts, and even civil disobedience. Resistance in the Palestinian context cannot be separated from the overall local, regional, and global variables and forces. Initially, the organized resistance movement began in 1918 with the establishment of the first National Committee when it rejected the outcomes of the Paris peace conference and Balfour Declaration in 1917. The Committee boycotted the early Zionist arrivals to Palestine economically and socially, and that movement reached its peak in 1936 during all over the country strikes.

The outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 paved the way for more organized and mass-oriented participation. For the first time, the nonviolent, peaceful demonstration put political goals that are achievable, measurable, and rational. The eruption of the second Al Aqsa Intifada in 2000 due to

the failure of the peace process and due to Israeli colonial policies and procedures, the Palestinians used all types of armed and non-armed tools.

There are countless opinions regarding the definition of nonviolent resistance. However, most of them fall under the framework of popular resistance. Regarding the Palestinian cause, it is hard to claim one specific definition of nonviolent resistance that all people might agree on and adopt. Generally speaking, one can say that Palestinian nonviolent resistance involves all means of performing pressure on the Israeli Occupation, which does not include any violence. It became an intrinsic part of Palestinian culture for somebody to hold a stone if he experiences a sense of fear.

The concept of nonviolent resistance is met by the objection of some activists, as it has implications and repercussions. Others believe that nonviolent resistance may have political reflections and orientations. Thus, many prefer to use the term of popular resistance for the following reasons:

1. The concept of nonviolent resistance is a term that does not indicate an evolution of legitimate resistance.
2. Nonviolent resistance is a commitment by the protesters not to practice any action that disturbs the occupation, even if it is verbal.
3. Nonviolent resistance is a limited-term and has no horizon.
4. Nonviolent resistance could be defined as a form of resistance that prevents violence escalation and wide-scale confrontation.

Nonviolent resistance is a form of popular resistance that engages different groups of society and is open to participation from all sectors, regardless of economic class or political affiliation. Usually, it is an unorganized type of resistance performed by ordinary people, integrating men, women, and children to protest against injustices committed by the state. Race, gender, and religion are overlooked when it comes to nonviolent resistance. Though no specific organization underlies such movements, they usually develop a structure and leadership that becomes clearer as the resistance spreads and grows.

In the light of the previous overview, we believe that nonviolent resistance is an uncontrolled, spontaneous reaction by different sectors of people in response to the injustice that has been

inflicted upon them. The nonviolent resistance permanence comes out field commanders who set the goal of liberating the people from occupation and removing injustice and aggression. The popular peaceful, nonviolent resistance is of significant influence if it invests in media and motivates all people to be engaged in demonstrations, marches, and events. Furthermore, the focus should be on the formation of a united front for popular resistance represented by the national frameworks and local networks through strategic alliance and partnership. Various forces should be committed to participating in the varied nonviolent resistance activities and maintaining the popular image of resistance. The movement on the ground must maintain a relationship with the National Authority and the formal bodies. Moreover, it should not be connected with the agenda of the Authority and its political tracks but to act as a field wing to support relevant solutions to the national cause.

Nonviolent resistance is a strategy to stand against the occupation and cost it a high price on a daily basis. The philosophy of nonviolence, contrary to armed approach, is to reduce the costs bear by people and raise the costs for the occupation.

It is possible for the popular Palestinian resistance to be integrated within the Palestinian strategic action if the Palestinian leadership has shown itself willing to cultivate a new generation of freedom fighters, giving young people the opportunity to play a greater role. Mohammed Sroor, a popular resistance activist, sees a need to set in motion all community segments, thus avoiding the domination of a bunch of the elite. "It is also necessary not to dilute the role of the resistance through pointless posing for photos during demonstrations and to deal with the Palestinian cause as a humanitarian issue." (Personal Communication, 22-2-2019) Jamal Nazzal, a Member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, believes that popular resistance can also be incorporated within the strategic action by linking it to the national goals and the inherent rights to freedom and independence. "Any popular action consistent with these rights will naturally serve the national goals and enhance gains in all areas (Personal Communication, 2-2-2019).

Equally important is the implementation of PLO Central Council resolutions. Baha Froukh, a popular resistance activist, says these resolutions, in addition to emphasizing the above-mentioned points, called all factions to actively take part in popular resistance, and cautioned against some

groups' behavior that scares people away from popular resistance (e.g., planning ineffective soft events) (Personal Communication, 22-2-2019). Frouhk continued to say that we also need a political structure commensurate with our current situation, being a nation occupied by another state. Therefore, the public institutions require some restructuring, thus transforming from top-heavy bureaucratic structures into more balanced structures that can deliver more effective services and boost resilience all over Palestine, especially in area C. Naturally, effective structures produce organizations that hire people for genuine reasons, not for buying loyalty or reducing unemployment According to Froukh, popular resistance has failed to grow horizontally with the existing methods. "We have to catalyze it by accommodating smart, popular resistance."

All the same, since the beginning of the long-standing conflict with the occupation, the Palestinians have never adopted a well-defined strategy and rather often prioritized particular forms of a struggle depending on the situation. Though the struggle strategy has different forms- including popular resistance- the armed struggle has often been the dominant option. Jamal Nazzal considered the point that "we must now determine a confrontation strategy that makes the occupation pay much. One can think of all legitimate and diplomatic methods: solidarity movements, media channels, popular protest, demonstrations, civil disobedience and boycott."

Popular assistance is highly acclaimed in Palestine, with all factions having some members fully or partially engaged. However, none of these factions has prioritized popular resistance, and thus the resources earmarked for this purpose are inadequate, and well-thought plans do not exist. Indeed, factions step up their actions in response to seasonal events and often seek propaganda purposes and media presence. According to Omer Mansour, the Palestinian leadership virtually advocates peaceful popular resistance; yet its action has been confined to diplomatic efforts at the international arena. "The leadership behavior has done nothing to make its "peaceful" resistance ubiquitous." (Personal Communication, 23-2-2029)

V. FORMATION OF THE POPULAR RESISTANCE COMMITTEES (PRC) DURING AL-AQSA INTIFADA

Three types of PRC were established during the second intifada 2000-2005:

1. In response to the separation wall that Israel erected during the second militarized uprising.
2. To counter the illegal settlement activities all over the West Bank.
3. To consolidate and strengthen resilience for the Palestinians residing in area C, especially in Jordan Valley and along the Wall line.

Many people and activists working within these committees confirm that restoring to strategic nonviolence in our context is justified on the basis of the following factors and grounds:

1. The failure of the Oslo peace process that launched in 1993 with Israel and the political stalemate of political negotiations led the people to start thinking about the need to follow another action plan of liberation.
2. The realization that the armed struggle of the second intifada had been destructive and negative in its final consequences.
3. Asymmetric balance of power between the Palestinians and the occupation so that pursuing violent means would play in the hands of Israel .
4. The example of the first nonviolent intifada showed that Israel was less capable of dealing with peaceful and unarmed protesters .

The majority of PRCs surveyed appeared to have no formal structure. Most of them have been formed by local activists in reaction to a perceived threat to the well-being of their community. Even where there is a formal structure with office-holders, people were appointed to particular positions by consensus rather than formal electoral process. Typically, it would seem that activists who came to notice due to their commitment to the protest actions would be invited to participate in the deliberations of the PRC.

Three main methods were used to defend people's rights in the face of harassment from settlers and Israeli security forces:

1. Accompaniment and protection,
2. Documentation, advocacy, and media work
3. Using the Israeli legal system

The major focus of PRCs is on the defense of land and property threatened by the Wall or by settler activity. Key methods of resistance included:

1. Protest demonstrations
2. Using the Israeli legal system
3. Documentation, advocacy, and media work
4. Constructive action to reclaim and use land threatened with confiscation

Enhancing the resilience of communities and their' way of life.': A significant form of resistance has been Sumud: the determination to remain on the land and maintain one's way of life constitutes a form of resistance, as it manifests a refusal to submit and surrender in the face of the dominant occupying power. This form of resistance activity was particularly pronounced in Area C.

Offensive activities to impose cost on Israel: Any form of protest and resistance can be seen to have an 'offensive' dimension insofar as it requires a response from Israel. The cost can be financial, moral, over-burdening of infrastructure and personnel. In addition, there has been a growing interest amongst Palestinians in the boycott of Israeli goods which can impose an economic cost on Israel.

VI. CHALLENGES FACING PCRS.

Activists identified a series of challenges they faced in trying to broaden and deepen the PRs.

1. Crisis of leadership

As a consequence of the political fracture between Fatah and Hamas and the internal tensions within Fatah a major challenge is the crisis of leadership within the Palestinian political domain. (Darweish & Rigby, 2015: 96-114)

2. Lack of strategy

One consequence of the political divisions and lack of leadership was a lack of a strategy and vision to inform and guide activists within the PR m 3. Lack of coordination. The political divisions

have been mirrored by the establishment of different networks claiming to fulfil a PR coordination function. There are four coordinating networks aligned with different political threads and a consequent lack of coordination of PR.

3. Lack of trust

The other side of the crisis of leadership coin appeared to be the pervasive lack of trust held by Palestinians in leadership at any level, a lack of trust that could extend down to the community level with some people questioning the motives and integrity of local popular resistance leaders.

4. 'NGO-isation' of civil society and Competition for funding

This pervasive lack of trust could be attributed not only to the political divisions and fractures but also to the 'NGO-isation' of Palestinian civil society, completion with each other for funding and the consequent weakening of community-based organizations dependent on volunteer involvement and activism.

5. Rates of participation

The cynicism about the motivation of anyone taking a leadership role helps explain another challenge reported to us: the low rate of participation and problems of mobilizing people. (Darwrish & Rigby: 2015)

6. Lack of substantive achievements

The lack of substantive results and achievements is another factor that helps to explain the relatively low rates of participation and the associated challenge of mobilizing people.

7. Sense of resignation and loss of hope

All this has contributed to a widespread sense of resignation referred to by a number of informants, a factor which was borne out by the results of the opinion polls that revealed only a third of Palestinian respondents entertaining any hope for a future peace settlement.

8. Palestinian short-termism

One of our interviewees expressed the view: 'There is the problem of the media and the glorification of armed struggle. There is a culture of violence in our society and an impatient short-termism – we expect results within a day. '

9. Israeli sanctions

The impact of Israeli sanctions and intimidatory measures should not be underestimated, with some respondents identifying the lack of financial support as a significant challenge when faced with the costs of fines and family support when the main family bread-winners have been jailed (Darweish & Rigby: 2015).

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6. DEALING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS. ANALYSES, CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND A CASE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

Environmental conflicts have emerged as key issues at different levels and scales, threatening the welfare and safety of people, communities and territories throughout the world. Environmental problems are widespread and increasing rapidly, and often generated by extractive and development projects, which are also conditioned by significant environmental problems are often

generated by extractive and development projects, which also have important conditioning factors of power inequalities, violence and destructive processes with nature.

Therefore, the analysis of environmental conflicts is a consolidated but still emerging field of study. These conflicts are mainly addressed from two interdisciplinary academic fields, Political Ecology and Peace and Conflict Studies.

This chapter aims to present a brief conceptualization of environmental conflicts combining the approaches of Political Ecology and Peace Studies. Its analytical potential will be discussed taking as an example a case of socio-environmental conflict in Ecuador, analysed from both perspectives.

I. ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND ANALYSES

The association between the environment and conflicts is varied and complex, and the causes of environmental conflicts vary across the globe and their manifestations differ considerably: from the control over key natural resources, such as minerals, fossil fuels or water; to contestations over natural resources at the community level.

In this chapter we will focus on environmental, or socio-environmental, conflicts at the social and community level. In this sense, environmental conflicts can be defined generically as social conflicts in which some environmental component is at stake (Santandreu y Gudynas, 1998; Sabatini y Sepúlveda, 2002). Conflicts related to privatising nature, especially land ownership, are prevalent.

Some general characteristics of social conflicts can be highlighted. First, they are processes, so they are not static and have a temporal development. Second, these processes take place in the public sphere, thus excluding disputes in the private sphere. Third, and most important, damage to the environment can be considered as the basis of a potential environmental conflict. However, if there are no actions on the part of social actors that in turn generate reactions in other actors, we are not dealing with an environmental conflict.

A social conflict is a social conflict when it adopts public status and involves more than one actor. It therefore presupposes collective actions, in which groups of people enter into dispute. In short, a conflict alludes to a dynamic of opposition, controversy, dispute or protest of actors (Walter, 2009).

Within this frame, there are some factors that can trigger and exacerbate conflict: exploitation of environmental resources which derives in dispossession of land and territories; divergent attitudes, valuations and beliefs regarding nature and land; and institutional and governance factors. The distribution factor is also crucial, as these conflicts usually "entail the access, appropriation, and distribution of natural resources for some, excluding others" (Llosa, 2019). This view is shared by many academics whose work is a benchmark in the field. (e.g., Guha and Martínez Alier 1997; Sabatini and Sepúlveda 2002; Escobar 2005, 2007, 2008; Alimonda, 2015).

The following section presents a number of conceptualisations of the concept of environmental conflict. The conceptual framework is constructed with reference to the dominant views in the field of political ecology, with specific contributions from peace and conflict studies.

I.1 Conceptualizations and definitions

We start with a definition of socio-environmental conflict related to the approaches presented before. As As Mariestella Svampa (2012) states, socio-environmental conflicts are related to the access and control of natural resources, where different actors with different interests and values are confronted in a context of great power asymmetry.

The issues of different interest and values and the power asymmetries are central to this approach. This vision is related to the concept of *Ecological Distribution Conflicts,* coined by Joan Martinez Alier and Martin O'Connor in 1996 to describe "social conflicts born from the unfair access to natural resources and the unjust burdens of pollution. Environmental benefits and costs are distributed in a way that causes conflicts" (EJOLT).

Another interesting concept related to *t*hese aspects of distribution and power asymmetry is the *Environmentalism of the Poor*. It is an analytical focus on conflicts that have an ecological element and social justice claims, which involve impoverished populations struggling against the state or against private companies that threaten their livelihood, health and culture. These movements are born from the resistance against the disproportionate use of environmental resources by powerful actors (Martínez Alier, 2004).

The term *Languages of valuation* refers to clashes of different interests because of the existence of different values. Environmental conflicts are often expressed as conflicts of valuation, either within the parameters of one single standard of valuation or across plural values. Thus, as we will see later, in a mining conflict, the company will argue in terms of the money, employment, taxes and royalties, while the opposition may argue in terms of risks to health, damage to water availability, infringement of indigenous rights to the territory under Convention 169 of ILO, or in terms of the sacredness of a mountain or a river.

The resistance processes and struggles of these communities can be analysed in terms of *Environmental Justice* movements. During the last three decades, many communities and social movements across the world have embraced this concept to structure their protest to protect their environment and ways of life against the appropriation, transformation and dispossession of nature. The Environmental Justice Atlas (http://ejatlas.org) provides information about more than 2000 environmental conflicts, many of them in the global South (Temper, del Bene, and Martinez-Alier, 2015).

According to David Harvey (1996), the environmental justice "has its origins in the inequalities of power and the way those inequalities have distinctive environmental consequences for the marginalized and the impoverished, for those who may be freely denigrated as 'others,' or as 'people out of place'". The concept dates back to the decade of 1980 in the United States of America, when there was an increasing awareness of the unequal distribution of environmental degradation along class, racial, cultural background and gender. Because of these origins, first-generation environmental justice studies were focused on environmental injustices in the US

(Schlosberg, 2008), but the concept has gained enormous popularity in recent years, and several studies have focused on different parts of the world, especially the global south.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency –Office of Environmental Justice defines environmental justice it as the "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work." (EPA, 2020)[14]

Meanwhile, the South African Environmental Justice Networking Forum[15] states:
"Environmental justice is about social transformation directed towards meeting basic human needs and enhancing our quality of life–economic quality, healthcare, housing, human rights, environmental protection, and democracy. In linking environmental and social justice issues the environmental justice approach seeks to challenge the abuse of power which results in poor people having to suffer the effects of environmental damage caused by the greed of others."

Having established the conceptual framework of environmental conflicts, the following section will show different perspectives of analysis.

I.2. Analysing environmental conflicts: Political Ecology vs. Peace and Conflict Studies
As we have seen, environmental conflicts are linked to political, economic, social and ecological contexts, but usually studies or intervention strategies to address these conflicts do not adopt an integrated and interdisciplinary approach. Rather, in many in many monodisciplinary works, one aspect is focused on in a fragmented manner and the others are neglected. Here we will showcase two distinct but complementary multidisciplinary perspectives on environmental conflict analysis: political ecology and peace and conflict studies.

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[14] https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice
[15] http://www.ngopulse.org/article/environmental-justice-networking-forum

Political ecology focuses on the causes and consequences of uneven power relations over natural resources and the environment. Moreover, a referent scholar like Martínez-Alier (2002:71) has defined political ecology as "the study of ecological distribution conflicts", while Paul Robbins highlights "environmental conflict" as one of the major areas of political ecology (2012:14). But political ecology has not theorized conflict explicitly, in contrast with peace and conflict studies. (Le Billon and Duffy, 2018).

On the other hand, researchers from peace and conflict studies have focused on the causal effects of environmental change, often in relation to the concept of 'resource scarcity' applied to land o, natural resources like 'strategic' fuels and minerals (Homer-Dixon, 1991). As a result, to date there is a lack of connection and limited engagement between fields, if not critiques of methodological approaches (Le Billon and Duffy, 2018).

There are certainly obvious differences between both theoretical backgrounds. While political ecology is mainly influenced from disciplines that avoid environmental determinism like anthropology or human geography; the positivist approaches to determine the causal effects of environmental factors on conflicts (associated with political science or experimental sciences).

But there are also some remarkable connections that need to be highlighted, for example political ecology's renewed engagement with 'materialism' reflected in several referential works and authors like David Harvey or Joan Martínez-Alier. Also in the field of conflict studies' there are increasing the nuanced mixed-methods research on environment-related conflicts. Moreover, like Le Billon And Duffy state: "political ecology's emphasis on uneven power relations and pursuit of environmental justice resonates with the structural violence approaches and social justice agenda of peace and conflict studies." (Le Billon and Duffy, 2018).

These connections suggest that both political ecology and peace and conflict studies could benefit from a better understanding between fields. Especially, in order to develop analyses of the dynamic interplay between socio-environmental changes and conflicts. Taking this into account, in the next section I present two different analyses and interventions related two both approaches, focused on the same context of environmental conflict.

II. A CASE STUDY FROM TWO PERSPECTIVES: SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS IN ECUADOR

First, I will describe a project intervention that was mostly influenced by a typical peace and conflict studies approach. The project was entitled "Socio-environmental Conflicts Monitoring Model in El Pangui, Ecuador". The description of the case study is based on my work as a researcher for three years as part of the research team of the Observatory of Socio-environmental Conflicts of the Technical University of Loja (OBSA).

II.1 A proposal for a monitoring model and a dialogue space at the local level (Peace and Conflict Studies Approach)

"El Mirador" is a large-scale mining project to extract 60,000 tons of copper per day in an area of 9,928,000 hectares. It is located in Tundayme, canton El Pangui, in the southeast of the Ecuadorian Amazon. The magnitude of large-scale extractive activity is unprecedented in Ecuador and is generating the ecological and social damage and an increasing climate of conflict.. The origin of the research project described here was based on a request from the affected community in 2011, when a representative of the local governments asked OBSA to collaborate on the management of socio-environmental conflicts.

In 2012, several workshops on conflict management were held in the community, and during the same year a research was carried out on the perception of socio-environmental conflict in the canton. The monitoring model was proposed as a tool for the management of environmental conflicts at the local level, and for the production of scientific and technical knowledge to share and / or confront with data from official sources.

Therefore, the Socio-environmental Conflicts Monitoring Model was designed with a dual purpose. On the one hand it was tool for research and scientific knowledge production. Through it, different local actors would have access and collaborate in the generation of scientific data on socio-environmental conflict in the canton. On the other hand, in order to share and contrast these

data, we proposed the possibility of generating multi-stakeholder dialogues as an alternative method for conflict resolution. There, the parties involved could discuss local conflicts based on scientific data produced by themselves in some cases.

The preliminary design of the Model included actors of different types:
- Local and regional governments
- Representatives of civil society in the canton (including indigenous and anti-mining groups)
- Representatives of the national government through the Ministry of the Environment (MAE), SENPLADES, the Secretariat of Political Management and the Regulatory and Mining Control Authority (ARCOM);
- And finally, representatives of the mining company Ecuacorrientes S.A. (ECSA).

The local governments were very positive about the proposal, and in fact collaborated actively in the project (active participation of environmental technicians and even the presidents). The majority of state representatives pointed out that it would be very difficult to put all the actors at the same table and create spaces for dialogue. According to SENPLADES Zonal director, some of the actors are "sources of conflicts", referring to their anti-mining profile.

Another recurring issue that came out in the meetings was the need of linking and get together representatives from different ministries and state entities, such as SENPLADES, MAE, ARCOM, Ecuador Estratégico y Secretaría de Gestión Política. Several people also suggested that it would be difficult to coordinate these spaces, since relations between different ministries and institutions were problematic.

There were also difficulties in securing the integration of representatives of civil society. Following the mapping of actors and the first meetings with different representatives, we decided to give priority to the integration of the canton's anti-mining sector, to compensate the balance of positions in the multiactor space. This sector was represented by t the newly created Amazonian Community of Social Action Cordillera del Cóndor Mirador, Cascomi.

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Some of the anti-mining representatives interviewed expressed their hesitation to get involved in this kind of process. For them implies a degree of commitment and dedication to a task of which they do not expect to obtain positive results. Finally, a key element of the multi-actor space was to involve the representatives of ECSA. The representatives of ECSA were changing their attitude over time about our invitations to participate. At first they were interested in participating, since a space of this type could be useful to manage the conflict at the local level.

But finally they refused to participate, and therefore, the model had to be redefined. The new approach was based on defining a local management tool for socio-environmental conflicts with the participation of local governments and representatives of civil society.

And although the failure to implement the space for dialogue and negotiation was a disappointment, there was also a positive side to it. According t the study by Henri Acselrad and collaborators in 2010 reviews multiple cases of application of Alternative Methods of Conflict Resolution in Latin America. They find that the results were generally negative, ranging from experiences that contributed to the "pacification" of the conflict without changing the bases/causes of the conflict; to the objections and the refusal to participate in this type of space by some actors, who develop a critical view of the negotiation space that is offered. In most of the cases, the actors with more political and economic power to appropriate such spaces and limit the participation of the affected communities to a figurative issue. Thus, they favour the maintenance of the structural conditions of the conflict without any positive transformation.

In our view, there were several reasons for this failure to set up an effective dialogue process. In the first place, the asymmetry of power between the parties. It made the actors with less political and economic power, especially anti-mining leaders, suspicious of this type of space. At the same time, the actors with greater power, such as the company and the State, did not see the need for this space, as they had the backing of the government's strong commitment to carry out a project considered strategic. It is true that some state officials interviewed were interested in establishing a dialogue, since it could help to reduce local conflict and facilitate their work on the ground. However, the complexity of the Ecuadorian state apparatus in terms of attributions and competences with respect to mining and its associated conflicts made it very difficult to complete

this task. Finally, a context as polarized as El Pangui in relation to mining, with a history of violent episodes, hinders the participation of the most polarized actors.

To conclude this section, I'd like to add some thoughts and reflections on this specific case and this type of intervention. In Ecuador, at the time of the referred project, the most important player at the internal level was undoubtedly the central government, with all its dependent institutions. Its representatives have always spoken out in favour of large-scale mining. Its position (at least in terms of strategic projects) is fixed although it may conflict with regulations, the Constitution or even international agreements. This position is not only explained in terms of needs of incomes in the long term. To finance several of the emblematic development and infrastructure projects, the Ecuadorian state became disproportionately indebted to the Republic of China: 27.1% of the external debt (equivalent to USD 5,466.4 million). Several credits are linked to conditions, which consist of the execution of projects by Chinese companies.

In this context, would it be possible that the extractive policy of the Ecuadorian state was influenced by the opinion, interests or needs of the affected populations? Would a mining company, no matter how "sensitive" it could be, abstain from a lucrative mining project?

If the answer to the two previous questions is negative, we find the situation that the origin of the activity is not in question. In other words, there is no longer any discussion about the "yes" or "no" to mining, but only about the "how". Since neither the State nor the companies question the extraction itself, anti-mining groups do not see clearly what the benefits of participating in such dialogues might be. On the contrary, as already indicated in the text, these spaces could favour the "status quo" and lessen protests and anti-extractive resistance without altering the basis of the conflict.

II.2 A collaborative research alongside an environmental justice movement (Political Ecology Approach)

In the same context of socio-environmental conflict in the Ecuadorian Amazon, another research project took place with a different theoretical foundation, closer to the political ecology perspectives and concepts analysed before, like ecological distribution conflicts or environmental

justice. The research focused processes of counterwork of local activists mobilize in attempts to influence decisions regarding socio-environmental transformation caused by the mining project, that could be defined as an environmental justice movement. These processes include:

a) legal claims of Free, prior and informed consultation
b) participatory territorial planning,
c) mobilization against land evictions, and
d) a collaborative research initiative to establish community based environmental monitoring.

The empirical focal point of the research was, again, the zone of 'direct influence' of the "el Mirador" project in the Southern Ecuadorian Amazon. Local mobilization was viewed in relation to wider social-political network building and in interfaces between civil society and public institutions. Special attention was given to affected people's political uses of formal instruments of participation and authoritative forms of knowledge in attempts to mobilize a resistance potential.

The kind of collaborative research focused here was an alliance between university based researchers with an environmental justice movement of affected people in the area. The idea was to provide affected local population with tools and methods for independent monitoring of water quality and change, in an area affected by large-scale mining. This collaborative work could be viewed as a first step in a longer process of making political use of dominant scientific discourse on environmental risk, risk management and accountability.

These were efforts to establish alternative practices of scientific knowledge production regarding the transformation that the mining project generates. The objective was to establish an independent monitoring practice with affected people, and enable the formation of community based researchers who can contest and confront with hard facts the many modes of 'responsible mining' reality that the company and Ecuadorian authorities construct around and in relation to this project in order to justify the intervention.

The open cast mine was designed to extract copper and other minerals operations that involve an immense waste problematic, which needs an extensive waste infrastructure and will provoke increased vulnerability among the local communities. The lives that are threatened by this

intervention are basically livestock herders (*mestizos* or *colonos*) and small-scale agriculturalists indigenous communities, the Shuar people.

Community based monitoring of environmental impact was introduced in the area through a collaboration between local population affected by the Mirador project and the OBSA team, setting up participatory environmental monitoring in several of the communities in the area adjacent to the mining project.

The idea behind the participatory monitoring had two intertwined objectives. On the one hand, to obtain alternative scientific information on the environmental impacts that the mining project was generating in the area, due to the difficulties in accessing official data. On the other hand, the aim was to involve the local population in the process of knowledge production, in order to contribute to limiting the barriers between the language and techno-scientific procedures on environmental impacts and their own experience of the contamination and changes generated by the mining project.

The anti-mining association, a coalition of mestizo and Shuar indigenous activists constituting an environmental justice movement, view independent monitoring as a potential political instrument in their counterwork. Some in the movement talk about environmental monitoring as a 'science of resistance' (Sánchez-Vázquez, 2020) and indicates that the application of scientific methods and the production of scientific facts can be used to contest the hegemonic construction of environmental risk and risk management in a context of conflict.

Environmental monitoring as collaborative research forms part of what Kirsch (2014) calls politics of time, reflecting a growing awareness among environmental justice movements of the need to counter large-scale interventions early enough. This counterwork was targeting and contesting the work of "corporate science" carried out by the mining company, delaying the responses to the environmental impacts they occasion through its activity, as a strategy of diminishing responsibility for the externalities of this activity.

But despite its potential as a tool to transform the power positions within the environmental conflict, the participatory monitoring processes had a limited success. Early alerts that could have been mobilized through systematic monitoring activity were challenged by different and powerful knowledge practices regarding risk management and responsible mining, by the mining company and the Ecuadorian state. The experience of the popular environmentalists is that they have to fight many fronts at the same time, and resources and time are limited; first they face a substantial body of so-called 'scientific' and 'neutral' data about the mining project presented in a document that the affected people have limited access to; the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). People have limited possibilities to influence the information going into the EIA and as a result also to influence the authoritative representation of the project reality. They also have limited access to the EIA documents and hence to the reality described in them.

Consequently environmental impact assessment and the issue of water contamination had to be combined with the mobilization of legal resources related to participation and consultation rights (and claims for Free and informed consultation processes). The possibilities of connecting to indigenous rights and human rights networks and discourse are important elements in their political struggle for recognition and participation. In addition people face a situation of land dispossession, and mobilize against displacement through legal and direct action.

Despite the difficulties and disappointments, measuring environmental impact forms part of a powerful knowledge practice that can be captured by the affected people and be politicized. The potential is there, but in this case this potential is difficult to realize due to the need to multiple and constantly innovate strategies of counterwork.

As Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez-Garavito propose with their concept "sociology of emergency" temporary expressions of counterwork forms part of processes but not end products. This collaborative research initiative reveals a potential of resistance in an uncertain situation of extractive transformation and environmental conflict. The challenge viewed from a collaborative research perspective is how to take further steps in the formation of grassroot or community based researchers who can take part in counterwork that constantly has to change

strategies, especially when they sometimes face processes of criminalisation of protest, or even put their lives at stake.

In any case, following a recurrent debate in critical social studies, we should go beyond maximalist positions in the analysis of conflict and provide a complex view of these processes. This is an analytical approach that goes beyond measuring effectiveness in terms of specific successes or failures. This work is along the lines of highlighting local community initiatives that seek to create alternative possibilities and visions of life, despite the fragility and instability of these initiatives. Recognising the work of constructing "epistemologies of the South" and "ecologies of knowledge" (Santos and Meneses, 2014) in the strategies of resistance themselves; and visibilizing the forms of hegemonical use of the contra-hegemonic procedures, techniques and practices of the hegemonic powers (Santos, 2015).

What characterises this environmental justice movement of anti-mining resistance, in this case and in others described in the literature cited above, is the use of multiple resources that are continually changing and transforming, due to the alteration of the rules of the game by the authorities and the company. This web of actions, analysed from the combined perspective of political ecology and peace and conflict studies, has the fundamental objective of transforming the positions of power within the environmental conflict (Le Billon and Duffy, 2018; Webel and Galtung, 2007).

CONCLUSION

We have seen in this chapter how environmental conflicts have emerged as a threat to many communities and their territories around the world, especially in the global south.

As proposed here, to properly analyse such complex and multifaceted conflicts, multidisciplinary analytical approaches and interventions are ideal. Both peace and conflict studies approaches, as well as political ecology perspectives of analysis, have potential and limitations, as demonstrated in the example of the Ecuador case.

From here, we propose to take into account these limitations, but also the potentialities and promising avenues of work and intervention that can be opened up by combining both approaches. All of this with the aim of achieving positive transformations of environmental conflicts, in order to safeguard the well-being of communities and territories affected by these conflicts, contributing to their struggles for achieving environmental justice.

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CEOBS. The Conflict and Environment Observatory

https://ceobs.org/

EJAtlas. Mapping Environmental Justice
https://ejatlas.org/

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7. EMERGING OUT OF THE LABYRINTH. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN COLOMBIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS WITH THE FARC-EP

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Most recent history in Colombia begins with the period of "La Violencia" (the violence) following the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (9 April 1948). A civil war, irregular and undeclared, which lasted almost a decade and which built up the idea of a country with a Cainite society, intractable politics, and the development of multiple forms of violence and armed struggles. The military dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) did not even manage to control the situation, with policies of repression and generalized amnesties. 150,000 people were

murdered and more than two million Colombians were forced to leave the countryside in just one decade, from 1948 to 1957.

"La Violencia" in Colombia had antecedents in relation to the construction of the nation-state after independence and the use of violence as a functional instrument to accelerate or delay socio-political processes. Dozens of generalized or highly localized civil wars went through the 19th century (territorial model, economic resources, distribution of power, secularization, etc.). Among them was the "Thousand Days' War" (1899-1902), a paradigm of the confrontation between liberals and conservatives. The widespread idea was that of a Colombia in which the revolutionary cycle was inconclusive, open-ended and under permanent revision due to the lack of agreements and consensus to establish peaceful forms of participation and modernization.

Returning to "La Viiolencia", the internal armed conflict is one of the longest-lasting conflicts on the planet. Not even the period of the National Front (1958-1974), whose foundations were signed in Benidorm in 1956 and which was supposed to bring about pacification and alternation between the two major parties, liberals and conservatives, proved to be the solution, as it effectively closed the door to third political forces gaining the presidency of the Republic. Some of these emerging political forces gradually converged as opposition movements with institutional and political strategies or through the use of the armed struggle, or as a combination of both. Events such as the Cuban Revolution, the national security doctrine, the hardest periods of the Cold War, and internal processes in the country generated a veritable volcano ready to erupt.

From the 1960s, through the dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla (1974) until the Political Constitution (1991), the contradictions between the processes of modernization and the limited windows of opportunity for subordinate social sectors became more acute. During these decades, new political (and guerrilla) actors emerged or were consolidated, drug trafficking and drug cartels erupted with great force, and a cycle of protests broke out that were harshly repressed by various means, both institutional (security statute) and illegal (birth of paramilitarism). Attempts at reforms (agrarian, social, health and educational), together with localized processes of industrialization, agro-export and exploitation of energy resources proved insufficient to guarantee a transfer of benefits to the country's weaker economies and incomes, particularly because the economic model

was not democratized. In this context, the landscape of insurgent actors became more complex: the birth of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1964 (FARC-EP since 1982) was joined by the National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1965 and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) in the same year, the latter a movement that was initially Maoist and, from 1980, became Leninist. Somewhat later came the April 19 Movement (1973), as well as other minor guerrillas (such as Quintín Lame) (Gonyalons Sureda, 2017). Thousands of guerrillas, dozens of fronts, dynamics of action-repression, war actions with international or symbolic impact, the involvement of neighboring countries, the growing arms trafficking, the direct support of the United States for Colombian institutions, the development of drug trafficking and organized crime, and the rise of paramilitarism and other forms of self-defense groups had a balance of consequences and tragedies for many sectors of society (people, social and territorial fabric): Human rights violations, political genocide of the Unión Patriótica, land usurpation, forced displacement, traumas and processes of dehumanization, militarization of public life and serious damage to the political sphere.

Despite the fact that this situation seemed pre-revolutionary or a collapse of the system, neither the insurgent revolution triumphed nor did the state win. The option was to negotiate with the guerrillas in order to find a political way out towards peace. The successive administrations of Betancur (1982-1986), Barco (1986-1990) and Gaviria (1990-1995) initiated rapprochement processes (Pizarro 2017; Ríos 2017). Under Betancur, a first pact was reached with the FARC-EP, the Uribe Agreement (1984). It consisted of a mutual cessation of military hostilities and the creation of a new political party (Unión Patriótica) to channel the armed struggle towards the political route; however, paramilitarism, drug traffickers and state intelligence agencies began a systematic elimination of its members, which led the FARC-EP secretariat - which had not surrendered its weapons - to return to guerrilla activities. Under Virgilio Barco, a fruitful negotiation with the M-19 and other smaller groups was achieved in exchange for amnesties, pardons and a reintegration process that was eventually completed under César Gaviria and the constituent process (1991 Constitution). At the same time, the FARC-EP were harassed by attacking their headquarters (Casa Verde) to force them to negotiate. However, talks in Caracas and Tlaxcala (1992) were unsuccessful and the war intensified. Likewise, with the Pastrana presidency (1998-2002), the negotiating fuse was reopened with a new methodology: a 42,000 square kilometer zone of détente, the use of public hearings, an agenda of twelve issues and a

three-year negotiation process. It was a gradual disappointment that was symbolized by the "empty chair" (to reflect the FARC-EP's lack of political will). This sense of failure had profound electoral consequences represented by two presidential terms of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and his Democratic Security Policy. It also led to the militarization of civilian life, the denial of the armed conflict (which came to be considered an struggle against terrorism), an all-out war against the FARC-EP, and a programme of individual demobilizations (more than 20,000 FARC-EP and ELN guerrillas laid down their arms) and collective demobilizations (with the Self-Defense Groups - more than 31,000 - to whom the benefits of transitional justice were applied - the Justice and Peace Law of 2005). However, during this period, despite the military strikes against the guerrillas, the state did not achieve its desired defeat, nor did it increase the chances of pre-revolutionary conditions. A certain technical stalemate was on the horizon.

I FROM SATURATION POINT TO A NEW NEGOTIATION

The saturation of this "protracted" conflict has been multifaceted. International variables have intervened, such as the end of the Cold War, the subsequent policy against international terrorism, and the expansion of universal justice; together with regional variables, as governments close to the guerrillas have oriented their will towards negotiation. Power relations between the actors involved, a military stalemate of decades has tilted in favor of the state (Plan Colombia and the elimination of part of the guerrilla leadership), but not enough to guarantee a final victory; political evolution, neither revolution nor failed state, but serious deterioration of the rule of law and democracy (para-politics, narco-politics, false positives, military spending, etc.); and social dynamics, such as the weariness with the war and the civil society mobilizations for peace, which are not exempt from paradoxes and retreats.

The Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, who had hit the FARC-EP so hard in the Uribe Vélez administration, opened the "door to dialogue" when he won the presidency (June 2010). Ahead of the failure of Caguán and with a different methodology (Gutiérrez Loaiza 2012, 190-191), there were secret contacts, exploration meetings, talks and, finally, negotiations took place. These negotiations built a framework: a clear roadmap, recognition of the armed conflict without

euphemisms, agenda items, rules of operation, place of negotiations, composition of the negotiation teams, role of the international community, an agreed schedule with deadlines, and participation of the armed forces. A General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace was reached with five negotiation points (August 2012): rural reform, political participation, end of the conflict, illicit crops, and reparations for victims. With a closing of verification and endorsement of the agreement (Santos 2014, 58).

In the first phase, the government made concessions: It approved the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448/2011), laying the foundations for the right to the return of property that victims had to forcibly sell or abandon; it established the National Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT), aimed at establishing the effective presence of the social state in the areas most affected by the war; and it specified some transitional justice instruments (June 2012) within Article 22 of the Constitution ("Peace is a right and a duty of obligatory compliance") to facilitate negotiations with the FARC.

The following phases corresponded to more than five years of negotiations (2012-2016), in practice one for each issue to be negotiated. It was a process full of tensions and pressures, a change of venue (La Havana instead of Oslo in November 2012), built-in dynamics of war and crises that endangered the process. But the will was firm: to sit down to reach an end and reject the prolongation of the conflict. It was at stake the demobilization of 6.900 guerrilla members operating in 242 municipalities throughout the country was at stake.[16]

II. A CONFLICT IN FIGURES

The Colombian armed conflict caused 262.197 deaths from 1958 to 2018 (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013).[17] Most of them committed by paramilitary groups (94.754), guerrillas (35.683), state agents (9.804), demobilized groups (5.200), unidentified armed groups (28.000)

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[16] *BBC Mundo,* 22 de febrero de 2017.
[17] It also includes data from 2014-2018: http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/noticias/noticias-cmh/262-197-muertos-dejo-el-conflicto-armado

and unknown groups (36.000), among other perpetrators. Victims were mostly civilian (215.000) than combatants (47.000). There were eleven modalities of violence identified: military actions (46.500); attacks on villages (1.500); targeted assassinations (178.000); massacres (24.500); terrorist attacks (750); kidnappings (37.000); forced disappearances (80.000); sexual violence (15.000); damage to civilian property (370); recruitment and use of children and adolescents (18.000); and anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance (1.100). It must be added 5.7 million people forcibly displaced by the conflict (1985-2012). Most notable was the political genocide against the Unión Patriótica, which deprived the country of a left-wing (social democratic) alternative to the major parties (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018).

These are some of the quantifiable ravages, but there is a plethora of after-effects that will last for generations. Paramilitarism was by far the most damaging and violent agent, accounting for more than 55% of the deaths among the identified actors: it caused more than a third of the selective assassinations and almost 60% of the massacres. The guerrillas were responsible for more than 75% of kidnappings, 85% of attacks on civilian property, and 80 % of terrorist attacks.

III. THE HAVANA PROCESS AND THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

The first issue of the Agreement, the land reform, was recurrent. The FARC owed its existence and a certain social appeal to this issue. The statistics are eloquent on the concentration of land ownership (1% owns more than 50% of the land) and the density of tenure (farms larger than 500 hectares accounted for 29% in 1960, 46% in 2002, and 66% in 2017). In terms of land parceling, only 0.1% of landholdings are larger than 2,000 hectares, but they account for 60% of the land. And the problem of land adjudication and appropriation persists (43% of the owners of larger plots do not know the legal origin of their land), as well as the historic dispute between ranchers and farmers: some 34 million hectares, out of 43 million hectares of agricultural land, are dedicated to extensive livestock farming. 87% of those plots with more than 1,000 hectares are used for livestock and 13% for agriculture. The agro-export model is also exemplified in the Meta region, where 30% of the areas are planted with oil palm (Cardona y Latam, 2018; Oxfam, 2018).

In this regard, the Agreement elaborates policy guidelines for an integrated agrarian development: a) the stimulation of productivity, food security, associations (cooperatives), access to basic services, and the provision of easy credit for peasants; b) new national plans for an integral rural reform that connects rural and urban areas (infrastructure, development, planning), together with Territorially Focused Development Programmes that transfer more resources and financial capacity to small municipalities (Ríos, 2017:601), and c) a democratization of access to land ownership for peasants (creation of a fund with three million hectares over the next twelve years for free allocation and realization, plus another seven million hectares to facilitate access to property through soft credits for land purchase, support for land restitution, and the creation of peasant reserve zones linked to environmental plans).

The second point, political participation, aims to decriminalize politics for members of the opposition to the establishment, but it is also an unavoidable step to guarantee the transition from armed struggle to politics. Previous peace processes, with Virgilio Barco and César Gaviria, had granted some guerrilla leaders a favorable transition to politics (with posts as congressmen, senators, etc.). However, the FARC has not enjoyed the same treatment. The Peace Agreement has included the drafting of an Opposition Statute that develops Article 112 of the Constitution, as well as an Integral Security System for the exercise of political opposition, given that the genocide of the Unión Patriótica weighs like a heavy burden (Dudley 2008). Given the dynamics of political violence and the instability of peace, this is a good step, although it will be insufficient if attitudes do not change. The FARC also pushed for not only opposition parties, but also social movements and other sectors seriously affected by the conflict, to have a voice in the media and in parliament. The Agreement includes measures on community radios, democratization of the electromagnetic spectrum, explanation of the process in terms of the culture of peace and reconciliation. Likewise, the Agreement has created sixteen Special Transitory Circumscriptions for Peace, with sixteen representatives to the Congress until 2026, who will not belong to political parties, but to social organizations in the territories, with the function of making visible the negative effects of the war and possible solutions to it. As for the FARC itself, it was envisaged that it would become a political party (finally created in August 2017), keeping the acronym FARC (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria Revolucionaria del Común). This party obtained 85.000 votes in the first legislative elections it contested (2018), in Congress and Senate, which would not give them

parliamentary representation, but thanks to the Peace Agreement they were assigned five congressmen and five senators for eight years.

The third issue was the end of the conflict, the ceasefire, the laying down of arms and the demobilization of troops, including a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process of former combatants. Disarmament has been carried out by the United Nations (June 2017) and three memorials would be created with the melted-down weapons: in the United Nations, Cuba, and Colombia. Twenty Transitory Zones for Normalization (ZVTN) and seven Transitory Points for Normalization (PTN) were created for demobilization, which largely coincide with the open war blocs and fronts, reflecting a process of peripheralization of the conflict. These spaces have served to guarantee compliance, verification and monitoring of the ceasefire, disarmament and preparation of the guerrilla members for their social, work and health incorporation into civilian life, supervised by the National Police, the FARC itself and the United Nations through a complex Monitoring and Verification Mechanism, as well as security protocols. All of them, once registered, had their arrest warrants suspended and were subject to an amnesty law and, for those already captured in the past, a release order. In terms of reintegration, the Agreement favored group incorporation, not just individual incorporation, with the creation of the National Reincorporation Council, in charge of designing common social economies for the development of productive processes.[18]

The fourth point addressed the problem of drugs and illicit coca crops. This was one of the most difficult issues, as some of the actors involved (narcos) did not participate in La Havana negotiations. Nevertheless, the agenda included a prior agreement and three elements. The first agreement was the dissociation of the FARC from its past relationship with drug production and trafficking. The first element was the elaboration of an illicit crop substitution programme. Coca cultivation had been increasing: from 48.000 hectares in 2014 to 171.000 in 2017 (returning to the levels of 2000 and 2007), which means a cocaine production worth almost 3 billion dollars (about 900 tons of cocaine) (Henderson, 2010).[19] If the FARC disassociated itself from coca and its

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[18] On an individual basis, a former guerrilla member receives a basic monthly income of 90 percent of the minimum wage for a maximum of two years, about 5,200 euros in total.
[19] UNODC report: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/es/frontpage/2018/September/informe-de-unodc-reporta-alza-histrica-en-los-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia.html

commercialization, it is believed that it would leave behind a business worth more than a billion dollars, approximately half of its annual budget (Bejarano & Pizarro, 2003). It is thus understandable that any encouragement and state spending on demobilization would be cheaper than continuing the war or the use of pesticides, which has proved ineffective and dangerous to health, in order to stop drug production and cultivation. The substitution of illicit crops transcends the actors in the Agreement, who have understood that the creation of a National Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops together with the Integral Rural Reform should help to progressively solve the problem. It includes stimuli such as the provision of land to peasants, access to land property, creation of cooperatives, commercialization of new products, expansion of alternative crops, etc. These measures would form part of the integration of many current coca farmers into this process in exchange for joining the legal system (avoiding their persecution and criminalization), playing a leading role in community processes (which reinforce the sense of territory and belonging), and building a different country culture. The second element focused on the dismantling of money laundering organizations and criminal networks within the country, as well as intensifying pressure on the production and commercialization of narcotics, once again responding to the international call to solve the problem of the offer but not considering the drugs demand. And the third element considered that local consumption and its problems should be addressed under health scheme, with emphasis in the fields of prevention, comprehensive care and social inclusion. However, only the next few years will be able to shed light on the scope of this point of the Agreement: will the FARC renounce to the wealth provided by illicit crops and drug trafficking with little benefit from state funding? What actors (ELN, paramilitary groups, and others) could occupy the space left by the FARC? Is there a real risk that some of its guerrilla members will return to take the arms as a mean of livelihood or if the state will not comply with the agreement signed?

The fifth and final point took on consideration those victims of the conflict and transitional justice provisions. In La Habana, a complex and comprehensive "Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition" was designed. The general and international framework was provided by the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (1998), ratified by Colombia in 2002 and in force since 2009. It was informed too by the lessons learned from Law 975/2005 (Justice and Peace Law), benefiting paramilitary members mostly. This transitional justice system

put the focus as much on facilitating and encouraging an end to the conflict as it is on adequately attending to the victims. If the judicial system and politics worked, Colombia, like many other countries, would not have drifted into war. When war becomes unbearable, other solutions must be sought, which are not limited to the actors' choice between victory or defeat, but consist of a formula that is the result of an agreement. Alongside the end of the war are recognition and reparation for the victims, the clarification of the truth, the assumption of responsibilities and a system of guarantees to avoid repeating the violation of rights, and some kind of reconciliation. Three mechanisms were designed on this basis: 1) the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition, with the functions of a truth and reconciliation commission and which will be a sounding board for the testimony and suffering of the victims in its hearings and final report; 2) the Special Unit for the Search for Disappeared Persons, which it also has an extrajudicial nature and will facilitate the mapping of graves, identification work and handing over the remains, and 3) the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, a complex system of bodies that structure transitional justice and which will last for ten years, extendable for a further five, with the aim of resolving crimes against humanity that cannot be amnestied through alternative sentences, both for guerrilla members and state agents.

The Special Jurisdiction for Peace is one of the keys to the Agreement and the peace process with the FARC-EP. It will judge crimes committed until 24 November 2016 (signature of the agreement) and which are directly related to crimes against humanity. It is composed of five bodies with key competences to legally guarantee the peace process. Among them is the "Tribunal for Peace", in charge of specifying those responsible for crimes, the sanctions and the model for their enforcement (the alternative penalties of five to eight years of imprisonment for crimes that would triple the loss of liberty, in exchange for contributions to the reparation of victims and the clarification of truth). There is also the "Chamber for the Acknowledgement of Truth and Responsibility and the Determination of Facts and Conduct", responsible for receiving all information and selecting the most serious cases for trial by the first Tribunal. Thirdly, there is the "Amnesty and Pardon Chamber", for those who can aspire to this category, avoiding trial thanks to their high degree of collaboration with justice. Fourthly, there is the "Chamber for the Definition of Legal Situations", for doubtful cases of amnesty or the necessary referral to the Chamber of Recognition. And finally, the list closes with the "Investigation and Indictment Unit Chamber"

(the most technical), for those who do not recognize their responsibility and have to be investigated through police, forensic, etc., as well as having a sub-section for the investigation of cases of sexual violence.

It is a complex Final Agreement, loaded with guarantees and lessons learned, which includes a system of evaluation and monitoring: the "Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Final Agreement", made up of six members, half from each actor (with the reinforcement of international accompaniment) and for a period of ten years. In this commission was created a "Subcommission with a Gender Focus" with representation from women organizations to make this aspect visible and strengthen it. This institution is completed with the creation of an Implementation Framework Plan that will guide the public policies required for the fulfilment of the Final Agreement over the next fifteen years, which will be the main reference for the inclusion of the peace components in the next National Development Plans. Likewise, a Verification Mechanism composed of international representation from guarantor countries (Cuba, Norway, Venezuela, and Chile), as well as a technical-academic team from the Kroc Institute (University of Notre Dame), which is working to provide data on the degree of compliance with the 578 commitments of the Agreement. The most progress has been made in DDR and international accompaniment, and the least in rural reform and illicit crops (Ariza et al., 2019; Instituto Kroc de Estudios Internacionales de Paz, 2018 y 2019). Finally, an Agreement on endorsement, which the government interpreted as the call for a plebiscite to support President Santos in order to obtain legitimacy for his administration.

Thus, the agreement signed by the parties in La Havana on 24 August 2016, which could have been approved through parliamentary channels, was transferred to a plebiscite (October 2016) that was politically dynamited by multiple interests. This step conditioned not only the agreement but also the agenda to come. The 35 million Colombians of legal age were able to exercise their right to vote, but only 37% (some 13 million) participated, with the YES (49.79%) and the NO (50.21%). The difference was only 53.911 votes.[20] The symbolic burden of that defeat played and

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[20] The "no" map does not coincide with the FARC's historical areas of action and those most affected by the war, but rather with the social support of the main "no" party, that of Álvaro Uribe Vélez. In short, the "no" vote was conditioned by multiple factors (evaluation of Santos' policies, the complex and technical reading of the Final Agreement, the lack of education on the benefits of the end of the war, etc.) (Basset, 2018).

Iván Duque Márquez (August 2018). The elected president of Colombia is pro-Uribista, has deep doubts about the Agreement, and lacks sufficient political will to support the peace process along the agreed path. This had an immediate effect in the implementation of the Agreement, which was delayed and weakened, and direct violence continued against former guerrilla members and social-community leaders.[21] In this context, neither the UN Multi-Donor Fund nor the monitoring of the guarantor countries would be enough to keep the Agreement alive. Peace will be sustainable only if the government is committed to a state policy and not to a partisan one.

CONCLUSIONS

How is the bottle of peace now, half full or half empty? It is too early to tell. There are certain historical dynamics and actors that will have more difficulties to move towards peace. In fact, there is almost 1,000 dissident FARC-EP guerrilla members who decided not to support the Final Agreement. There are paramilitary groups still acting which were not demobilized that after the Justice and Peace process. The ELN guerrilla is active, as well as many drug trafficking networks and cartels, and these groups are not included in the peace process. Will Colombian society's resilience be strong enough to overcome this new starting point in the near future? Will the state finally be able to penetrate in those areas without institutions to impose its rationality? Will social and community leaders stop being assassinated?

The issues addressed by the Agreement reflect the attempt to address old structural problems (the agrarian question, insecure and dangerous participation in politics) and to find new sensitivities and historical acknowledgements that overcome the suffering and silencing of the victims. It is interesting to notice a great step forward in the agreement, with proposals to deal with illicit crops and drug trafficking, which express a common will, although it is not enough as a solution for this problem. There are many actors involved in this issue who were not present in La Havana. Also noteworthy is the technical neatness of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace architecture, which will

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[21] About 250 former guerrilla members and more than 1,300 social leaders have been killed from the signing of the peace agreement to the end of 2021, according to the database created by Indepaz: https://indepaz.org.co/

undoubtedly be useful for other conflicts in the future. Once again, however, it is a good start, but it is worth being cautious about its actual scope. In other words, whether it is only a legal solution to the problem of demobilization or whether it has more profound consequences for the historical injustices in Colombia that legitimized many actors to take up arms.

Finally, Colombia has historically had an admirable institutional, political and social capacity for negotiation and for making audacious moves that bring it closer to peace. However, much more than this is needed to close the revolutionary cycle and the stagnation of those elites that are not competent to modernize the country as a whole and to generate an economic and social model based on values of consensus, inclusion and social illusion. To a large extent, political and economic elites have used many social sectors to defend their interests or to use institutions in their favor throughout recent history.

The call for political openness, a new respect for the lives of adversaries, and the capacity for imagination and enthusiasm of its society motivate a cautious optimism that becomes more limited if we analyze the many issues that were not included in the Final Agreement and that the country has to address if it does not want to export the violence form the past to the future. Likewise, what was left out of the Final Agreement implies the construction of positive peace through reforms in political institutions, state administration, welfare, real access to education and healthcare. These reforms would match those values included in the 1991 Constitution and would support a more sustainable peace.

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